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understand how market design affects market performance through its impact 
on investment incentives. For this purpose, we study a two-stage game in 
which firms choose their capacities under demand uncertainty prior to bidding 
into the spot market. We analyse a number of different market design 
elements, including (i) two commonly used auction formats, the uniform-price 
and discriminatory auctions, (ii) price-caps and (iii) bid duration. We find that, 
although the discriminatory auction tends to lower prices, this does not imply 
that investment incentives at the margin are poorer; indeed, under reasonable 
assumptions on the shape of the demand distribution, the discriminatory 
auction induces (weakly) stronger investment incentives than the uniform-
price format. 
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1 Introduction
In recent years, electricity prices have been going up almost everywhere. It is beyond dispute
that sharp increases in fuel costs coupled with a tightening of supply and demand conditions
have contributed to these price increases. However, there is controversy regarding the responsi-
bility of other issues related to the design and structure of these markets. While some observers
have blamed the pricing problem on wholesale market design, which has alledegly facilitated
the exercise of market power,1 others have argued that changing the design could potentially
exacerbate the problem. A lack of adequate investments in generating capacity, as well as a
high degree of concentration, have also been pointed to as contributing factors. These wide-
spread concerns about the functioning of electricity markets have opened up the debate about
how to improve their overall performance. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to this
debate by analysing how market design affects the performance of electricity markets.
Previous analyses on this issue have tended to concentrate on price formation in the short
run, i.e., for given capacities (e.g. Federico and Rahman, 2003; Fabra, von der Fehr and Har-
bord, 2006). These analyses have at least two important limitations. Firstly, while short-run
price formation is certainly of interest - especially in markets characterised by imperfect com-
petition - in the longer run market performance depends first and foremost on the availability
of capacity. Secondly, there may be a trade off between achieving low prices and attracting
adequate investment.
We attempt to overcome these limitations by incorporating capacity decisions into the
analysis. Our analysis is based on a simple model of investment and price formation that
reflects essential features of deregulated electricity markets. The modelling approach extends
the one developed in Fabra, von der Fehr and Harbord (2006) by allowing for endogenous
capacities. In the two-stage game, it is assumed that firms make investment decisions under
demand uncertainty, prior to competing in the spot market. We analyse and compare a number
of different market design elements, including (i) the two commonly considered pricing formats
associated with the uniform-price and discriminatory (or pay-as-bid) auction, respectively; (ii)
the introduction of a price cap, and (iii) bid duration. Furthermore, we explore the effects of
long-run price-responsiveness of demand on investment incentives.
Our analysis complements and extends the earlier, albeit rather scant literature on invest-
ment incentives in electricity markets. A central topic in this literature is whether market-based
price signals provide sufficient incentives for new investment in markets characterised by im-
perfect competition.2 One of the first analysis of this topic was provided by von der Fehr and
1Complaints about the manipulation of wholesale markets led the European Commission to open an inquiry
into the functioning of the European energy markets (European Comission, 2007). Some national competition
authorities have also undertaken inquiries into the performance of these markets.
2The adequacy of investment incentives may also depend on how demand is rationed in cases in which price
cannot be adjusted to clear the market in all contingencies; we abstract from this issue here.
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Harbord (1998), who analyse a model closely related to ours but limited to the case in which
firms bid in a uniform-price auction under demand certainty. They found that capacity may
fall below or exceed the first best, depending upon parameter values. In order to investigate
how firms adjust their capacities in response to demand growth, Garc´ıa and Stachetti (2006)
introduce dynamics in a simplified version of the von der Fehr-Harbord model. They showed
that there exist equilibria that involve negligible or no excess capacity along the outcome path,
suggesting that additional incentives may be required for the market to deliver adequate invest-
ments. Within a dynamic model based on Cournot competition in the spot market, Bushnell
and Ishii (2007) found that asymmetries between firms, demand uncertainty and contractual
obligations impact on investment incentives. We confirm von der Fehr and Harbord (1998)’s
result that overinvestment is a theoretical possibility, but point out (in what appears to be
the empirically most relevant formulation) that underinvestment is more likely, at least if the
price cap is set below consumers’ willingness to pay for new capacity. We also demonstrate
that investment incentives in electricity markets depend on market design, an issue that was
not considered in the analyses mentioned above.
Some recent papers have also compared investment incentives in uniform-price and discrim-
inatory auctions. Within a model very similar to Fabra, von der Fehr and Harbord (2006)’s,
U´beda (2007) finds that both auction formats result in firms choosing capacities equal to the
Cournot outputs, leading to pay-off equivalence across auctions. However, this conclusion relies
heavily on demand being fixed and certain at the investment stage, an assumption which is at
odds with some of the features of electricity markets. Indeed, as acknowledged by the author,
his model is more about short-run availability decisions for existing capacity rather than about
long-run capacity investments.3
Cramton and Stoft (2006) provide an informal discussion of the long-run effects of choosing,
respectively, a uniform-price and a discriminatory (or pay-as-bid) format for the wholesale
market. Based on the premise that prices are typically lower with a discriminatory format,
they argue that incentives to invest are weaker with this format and hence that in the longer
run the discriminatory format does not perform as well as the uniform-price format. We
demonstrate that matters are not that simple. While it is true that, on average, returns to
investment are lower with a discriminatory format, at the margin investment incentives are
not necessarily weaker. Capacity additions affect price formation in the wholesale market
differently under the two formats, depending upon the realisation of demand. Whether the
market-price effect is stronger or weaker with the discriminatory format therefore depends on
how demand is distributed. For what appears to be the empirically most relevant demand
distribution (i.e., uniform or concave), we find that investment incentives are stronger with the
discriminatory format. The fact that the discriminatory format may provide more adequate
3Le Coq (2002) and Crampes and Creti (2005) analyse a similar issue but restrict attention to the uniform-
price auction with inelastic demand.
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investment incentives improves the relative supremacy of this format, at least from consumers’
point of view, since the discriminatory format also consistently provides lower prices than the
uniform-price format.4
Concerning price caps, we show that the wide-spread conjecture that eliminating them
would suffice for the market to deliver efficient outcomes is flawed as a general principle.5
While this is true under the discriminatory format, it is not under the uniform-price format;
indeed, the price cap may mitigate a tendency towards inefficient over-investment. Moreover,
from a consumer point-of-view, there is a trade-off between prices and capacity availability; a
larger capacity comes at the cost of higher prices and consumers prefer an effective price cap.
On the issue of whether bids in the wholesale market should have long or short duration, our
analysis also leads to clear results. When bids are long-lived (i.e., remain fixed over a period
in which demand varies considerably) prices tend to be higher, while investment incentives
are unaffected, compared to when bids are short-lived. Given that under long-lived bids the
discriminatory auction also outperforms the uniform-price format, we can conclude that in our
setting a combination of short-lived bids and the discriminatory format produces the most
favourable outcome from consumers’ point of view.
The question of whether price-responsiveness tends to stimulate or discourage investments
depends on whether capacity expansions translate into lower or higher prices, and hence more or
less demand. Such a link is not homogenous across auction formats: while capacity expansions
tend to reduce prices under the discriminatory auction, the opposite is true under the uniform-
price auction. Thus, the discriminatory auction delivers an aggregate capacity level that is
closer to the first best as compared to the uniform-price auction.
Lastly, our paper can also be framed within the emerging auction literature that analyses
the impact of market design on the longer-term choices of market participants. For instance,
Arozamena and Cantillon (2004) compare first-price and second-price single-unit sealed-bid
auctions in a model in which one of the bidders has the opportunity to invest in cost-reducing
activities prior to the auction.6 Even though our model differs from theirs in important aspects,
both analyses highlight the importance of strategic effects generated by investment decisions.
Athey, Levin and Seira (2004) endogenise entry decisions by heterogenous bidders in sealed-bid
and open auctions. Both theoretically end empirically they find that sealed bidding promotes
entry of weaker bidders, and discourages entry of stronger bidders, in ways that may reverse
4The overall assessment of the two pricing formats may depend also on concerns that are not represented in
our model; in particular, on productive inefficiencies. For a discussion, see Fabra et al. (2006).
5See Joskow (2006) for a discussion of how price caps create the so-called “missing money” problem in
electricity markets. More generally, Earle, Schmedders and Tatur (2007) show that an increase in the price cap
might be welfare improving when firms compete a` la Cournot under demand uncertainty.
6See also Tan (1992) and Piccione and Tan (1996). Unlike ours, all of these authors assume incomplete
cost information, single-unit auctions, investment in cost reducing activities, and they do not allow for demand
uncertainty.
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the revenue comparison obtained in models with a fixed set of bidders.
The structure of the paper is the following. In Section 2, we first describe our basic model,
in which we assume that demand is uniformly distributed, and then characterise and compare
equilibrium behaviour and outcomes across auction formats. In Section 3, we extend and
modify the basic model in several directions: we consider alternative equilibrium selection
criteria, we modify the assumptions on timing of bids and realisation of demand uncertainty,
we explore the effects of allowing for price-elastic demand functions in the long-run and we
introduce a general demand distribution function. The last section contains our conclusions.
2 The Basic Model
The modelling framework builds on that developed in Fabra, von der Fehr and Harbord (2006).
We consider a market in which two firms - Firm 1 and Firm 2 - offer a homogenous product.
The supply of firm i, qi , is constrained by installed capacity ki, i.e., 0 ≤ qi ≤ ki, i = 1, 2.
Firm i’s marginal cost of production equals zero for production levels below capacity, while
production above capacity is impossible (i.e. is infinitely costly). Demand θ is a random
variable, independent of price, which is distributed according to a uniform distribution function
on the unit interval.
The timing of the game is as follows. At the beginning of the game, firms make investment
decisions simultaneously. The unit cost of capacity is c. Once investment decisions have been
made, information about capacities become public knowledge. Next, demand is realised and
publicly observed and, subsequently, firms compete in prices. Each firm simultaneously and
independently submits a bid specifying the minimum price at which it is willing to supply the
whole of its capacity.7 We let b ≡ (b1, b2) denote the bid profile, where bi ≤ P is the bid of
firm i, i = 1, 2, and P > c is the ‘market reserve price’, possibly determined by regulation. On
the basis of the bid profile an auctioneer calls firms into operation. If firms submit different
bids, the lower-bidding firm’s capacity is despatched first. If this capacity is not sufficient to
satisfy demand, the higher-bidding firm’s capacity is despatched to serve residual or remaining
demand. If firms submit identical bids demand is split equally between them. Formally, the
output allocated to firm i, i = 1, 2, is given by
qi (θ;b) =

min {θ, ki} if bi < bj
1
2 min {θ, ki}+ 12 max {0, θ − kj} if bi = bj
max {0, θ − kj} if bi > bj .
(1)
7Fabra et al. (2006) allow firms to submit upward-sloping step offer-price functions. They show that (pure-
strategy) equilibrium outcomes - but not the equilibrium pricing strategies - are essentially independent of the
number of admissible steps in each firm’s bid function (and whether the ‘step sizes’ are choice variables for
suppliers). This implies that constraining firms to submit a single bid for their entire capacity is without loss of
generality in this setting.
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Note that supplies qi, i = 1, 2, are solely functions of demand and the bid profile. Payments
made to firms do depend upon the auction format, however. In the uniform-price auction, the
price received is equal to the highest accepted bid. In the discriminatory auction, the price
received by firm i is equal to its own offer price whenever its bid is wholly or partly accepted.
Both firms are assumed to be risk neutral and maximise expected profits.
For comparison purposes, we characterise the first-best capacity level, defined as the level
that maximises the sum of consumer and producer surplus. Let v denote consumers’ gross
utility per unit consumed - or total willingness to pay - and let K = k1 + k2 denote aggre-
gate capacity. Given that demand is completely inelastic prices are a pure transfer between
consumers and producers. Hence, total welfare is a function of K only:
W = v
 K∫
0
θdθ +
1∫
K
Kdθ
− cK. (2)
Maximisation of (2) with respect to K gives the optimal capacity:
KFB = 1− c
v
·
2.1 Uniform-Price Auction
We first consider the uniform-price auction, in which the price received by firms equals the
highest accepted bid. We start by characterising equilibrium bidding behaviour for every
possible demand realisation and then move to analysing the investment stage.
Let k− = min (k1, k2) ≤ k+ = max (k1, k2). We call the firm with capacity k− ‘the small
firm’ and the other ‘the large firm’. The following result then follows directly from the argument
in the proof of Proposition 2 in Fabra, von der Fehr and Harbord (2006):
Proposition 1 In the uniform-price auction, for given capacities and a given demand reali-
sation, equilibrium bidding behaviour and equilibrium outcomes are characterised as follows:
(i) (Low Demand) If θ ≤ k−, there exists a unique pure-strategy equilibrium in which both
firms bid at marginal cost and make zero profits.
(ii) (High Demand) If θ ≥ k−, there exist multiple pure-strategy equilibria in all of which
the highest accepted price is P . Equilibrium bidding behaviour and equilibrium outcomes depend
on to which of the following regions θ belongs:
(Region I) If k− ≤ θ ≤ k+, the large firm bids at P and the small firm bids a sufficiently low
price to make undercutting unprofitable. The small firm serves all capacity k− at P , whereas
the large firm serves residual demand θ − k− at P.
(Region II) If k+ ≤ θ < K, either one of the two firms bids at P and the other firm bids a
sufficiently low price to make undercutting unprofitable. The low-bidding firm sells all capacity
at P , whereas the high-bidding firm serves residual demand at P.
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(iii) (Very High Demand) If θ ≥ K, there exist multiple pure-strategy equilibria in all of
which at least one firm bids at P and both firms sell all capacity at P .
Equilibrium bidding behaviour depends on the relationship between firms’ capacities and
demand. For Low Demand realisations, both firms have enough capacity to serve total demand;
hence, competition drives prices down to marginal cost, and firms make zero profits. When
demand exceeds that level, so that at least one firm is unable to serve all of demand, marginal-
cost bidding is no longer an equilibrium. For High Demand realisations in Region I, only the
small firm’s capacity is below demand. Over this range, at the unique equilibrium outcome,
the small firm sells its capacity while the large firm maximises its profits by serving residual
demand at the market reserve price P. The bid submitted by the small firm has to be low
enough to discourage the large firm from undercutting, but it is otherwise irrelevant, as the
market price is set by the high bid. For High Demand realisations in Region II, the capacity
of both firms is needed to cover demand. Hence, there also exists equilibria in which the small
firm bids high and therefore sells below capacity if there is excess capacity overall. Last, for
Very High Demand realisations, demand exceeds aggregate capacity, so that both firms sell at
capacity at P .
Note that, for a given demand realisation, equilibrium outcomes are unique, except for
High Demand realisations in Region II. For the analysis of investment decisions, we need to
know which equilibrium will be played in this case. We assume that, when there exist multiple
equilibrium outcomes at the price-competition stage, either equilibrium is played with equal
probability; that is, the equilibrium in which firm i bids high is played with probability 12 .
As we point out in Section 3.1 below, where we discuss alternative equilibria, the qualitative
nature of our results do not depend on equilibrium selection.
Figure 1 summarises profit realisations; the upper expressions represent profits of the small
firm, while the lower expressions represent profits of the large firm. When demand is Low,
profits are zero for both firms. When demand is High or Very High, all output is paid the
market reserve price; in High Demand Region I, the small firm produces at full capacity, while
the large firm serves residual demand; in High Demand Region II, each firm is equally likely to
produce at full capacity and to serve residual demand only; when demand is Very High, both
firms produce at full capacity.
At the capacity-investment stage, demand is uncertain. Since equilibrium outcomes at the
price-competition stage depend on the relative size of firms’ capacities, expected profits are
given as follows, for i = 1, 2, i 6= j,
piui (ki, kj) =
{
piu−i if ki ≤ kj
piu+i if ki ≥ kj
6
θP
High
Demand I
High
Demand II
Very High
Demand
Pk
−
b
k
+
k
−
0
K 1
Pk
+
P [θ − k−]
P{1
2
k
− + 1
2
[θ − k+]}0
P{1
2
k
+ + 1
2
[θ − k−]}
Pk
−
Low
Demand
1
Figure 1: Profits in the uniform-price auction
where
piu−i = P
[
k+∫
k−
k−dθ +
K∫
k+
{
1
2k
− + 12 [θ − k+]
}
dθ +
1∫
K
k−dθ
]
− ck−
piu+i = P
[
k+∫
k−
[θ − k−] dθ +
K∫
k+
{
1
2k
+ + 12 [θ − k−]
}
dθ +
1∫
K
k+dθ
]
− ck+
(3)
The three elements in the main square brackets in (3) correspond to the equilibrium outcomes
for High and Very High Demand realisations, as defined in Proposition 1 and illustrated in
Figure 1 above. Note that, since piu−i = pi
u+
i at k
− = k+, the expected-profit function is
everywhere continuous.
To gain insight into investment incentives, we decompose the impact of an increase in a
firm’s capacity on its profits. The impact on the small firm’s profits of an increase in its
capacity of 4 is illustrated in Figure 2, which builds on Figure 1. An increase in capacity
has two distinct effects on the firm’s profit: (i) it leads to an increase in output whenever the
firm is capacity constrained; and (ii) it affects the type of equilibrium being played. The first
effect is present both for Very High and High Demand realisations, although in Region II it
occurs with probability 12 only (i.e., the probability that an equilibrium is played in which the
firm bids low). The second effect is present only in the region where the state of demand is
shifted from High to Low, where now the realised price becomes equal to marginal costs rather
than to the market reserve price (there is a second-order effect in the region where the state of
demand is shifted from Very High to High, but this becomes negligible for marginal increases
in capacity).
Figure 3 shows the corresponding impact on the large firm’s profit of an increase in its
capacity. Here the effect of an increase in output whenever the firm is capacity constrained
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θP
High
Demand I
High
Demand II
Very High
Demand
Low
Demand
+P 1
2
∆
b
k
+
k
−
0
K 1
+P 1
2
∆ +P∆
k
− + ∆ K + ∆
+P∆−Pk−
1
Figure 2: Effect on the small firm’s profits of a capacity increase in the uniform-price auction
is present only for High Demand Region II and Very High Demand realisations, whereas the
effect of a change in equilibrium is present where the state of demand is shifted from Region I
to Region II in High Demand and the large firm, rather than producing at full capacity with
probability 12 , serves residual demand only (again there is a second-order effect in the region
where the state of demand is shifted from Very High to High, which becomes negligible for
marginal increases in capacity).
Formally, the effect of a marginal increase in capacity becomes
∂piu−i
∂ki
= P [kj − ki]− 12Pki + P [1−K]− c (4)
∂piu+i
∂ki
= P [1−K]− c (5)
We see that the effect of a change in capacity differs between the small and the large firm. The
reason is twofold. First, only the small firm earns additional profits from a larger capacity in
High Demand Region I. Second, there are different effects on states of demand; an increase in
the small firm’s capacity shifts the border between Low and High Demand, whereas an increase
in the capacity of the large firm shifts the border between High Demand Regions I and II. When
the state of demand is shifted from High to Low, the small firm loses all profits from producing
at full capacity and selling at the market reserve price; when the state of demand is shifted
from High Demand Region I to Region II, the large firm loses profits corresponding to serving
residual demand rather than producing at full capacity.
The difference in marginal returns to investment for a small and a large firm translate into
a kink in firms’ profit functions. In particular, the partial derivative of the profit function of
8
θP
High
Demand I
High
Demand II
Very High
Demand
Low
Demand
+P 1
2
∆
b
k
+
k
−
0
K 1
+P 1
2
∆ +P∆
k
+ + ∆ K + ∆
0
−
P
12
{
k
+
−
[θ
−
k
−
]}
1
Figure 3: Effect on the large firm’s profits of a capacity increase in the uniform-price auction
firm i with respect to its own capacity is discontinuous at ki = kj ; that is,
lim
ki↓k
∂piu+i (ki, k)
∂ki
− lim
ki↑k
∂piu−i (ki, k)
∂ki
=
1
2
k > 0,
In other words, the gain in profit from (marginally) increasing capacity ‘jumps up’ at the point
where capacities are identical.
Second-order and cross derivatives are given by
∂2piu−i
∂k2i
= −5
2
P <
∂2piu−i
∂ki∂kj
= 0
∂2piu+i
∂k2i
=
∂2piu+i
∂ki∂kj
= −P < 0.
Since second-order derivatives are negative, the expected-profit function is piece-wise concave;
that is, for given kj , pii is concave as a function of ki both to the left and to the right of the point
at which capacities are identical (i.e., ki = kj). Furthermore, the sign of the cross derivatives
implies that marginal return to capacity is (weakly) decreasing in the rival’s capacity.
Figure 4 shows, for two different values of kj , firm i’s expected profits as a function of its
own capacity for an example in which P = 2 and c = 1. We have drawn piu−i and pi
u+
i for all
ki ≥ 0 for which the two functions attain positive values. The solid lines represent piui .
The unorthodox nature of profit functions implies that equilibrium cannot be determined
by the standard first-order approach. Moreover, reaction functions are discontinuous, and at
most one reaction-function crosses the 45◦-line. It follows that there cannot exist a symmetric
equilibrium.8
8We refer to the Appendix for details and proof of this and subsequent results.
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Figure 4: Firm i’s profits in the uniform auction for kj = 0.15 (left) and kj = 0.3 (right)
Proposition 2 In the uniform-price auction,
(i) there are exactly two pure-strategy equilibria in capacity choices, one with (k1, k2) =
(ku+, ku−) and the other with (k1, k2) = (ku−, ku+), where
ku+ =
3
5
[
1− c
P
]
> ku− =
2
5
[
1− c
P
]
.
(ii) Aggregate equilibrium capacity is Ku = 1− cP .
Proposition 2 says that there exists two asymmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria. In any
one of these equilibria, one firm invests more than its rival. Note that equilibria are asymmetric
even though firms are fully symmetric ex ante.9 Since equilibria differ only by the identity of
the small and the large firm, they are outcome equivalent; in particular, aggregate capacity
and expected prices are the same independently of which equilibrium is played. Capacities are
decreasing in capacity costs and increasing in the market reserve price.
Equilibrium profits of the small and the large firm are given as
piu−i =
20
100P
[
1− cP
]2
piu+i =
22
100P
[
1− cP
]2
Note that while the large firm earns higher profits than the small firm, the difference is relative
smaller than the difference in capacities; the reason is that the small firm tends to be despatched
at full capacity more often than the large firm. Nevertheless, if given a choice, either firm would
9A symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies also fails to exist in a two-stage duopoly model of capacity
investment and pricing in a homogeneous product market when market demand is uncertain, see Hviid (1991)
and Reynolds and Wilson (2000).
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prefer to be large. Profits are decreasing in capacity costs c and increasing in the market reserve
price P .
Since total capacity is increasing in the market reserve price, so is total welfare. An increase
in P affects consumer surplus in two different and opposing ways; on the one hand, consumers
benefit from a larger capacity (and hence a lower probability of rationing), but, on the other
hand, they lose from higher payments. Since the former effect dominates for low values of P ,
while the latter dominates for high P values, consumers are better off with an effective price
cap.10
2.2 Discriminatory Auction
In the discriminatory auction, the price received by firm i for its output is equal to its own
offer price whenever its bid is wholly or partly accepted. We concentrate our attention on the
points where the analysis for the discriminatory auction differs from that of the uniform-price
auction. The following result follows from the argument in the proof of Proposition 2 in Fabra,
von der Fehr and Harbord (2006):
Proposition 3 In the discriminatory auction, for given capacities and a given demand reali-
sation, equilibrium bidding behaviour and equilibrium outcomes are characterised as follows:
(i) (Low Demand) If θ ≤ k−, there exists a unique pure-strategy equilibrium in which both
firms bid at marginal cost and make zero profits.
(ii) (High demand) If θ ≥ k−, a pure-strategy equilibrium does not exist. In the unique
mixed-strategy equilibrium expected prices exceed marginal costs. Equilibrium bidding behaviour
and equilibrium outcomes depend on to which of the following regions θ belongs:
(Region I) If k− ≤ θ ≤ k+, the small firm makes expected profits P k−θ [θ − k−] whereas the
large makes expected profits P [θ − k−].
(Region II) If k+ ≤ θ < K, the small firm makes expected profits P k−
k+
[θ − k−] whereas the
large makes expected profits P [θ − k−].
(iii) (Very High Demand) If θ ≥ K, both firms sell all of their capacity at P .
Equilibrium outcomes are the same as in the uniform-price auction when demand is either
below the capacity of the small firm or above aggregate capacity. However, for other demand
realisations, competition is more vigorous in the discriminatory auction. In particular, for High
Demand realisations an equilibrium in which all production is paid at P cannot exist, given that
both firms would have incentives to undercut P in order to increase their production with only
a slight reduction in price. Indeed, only mixed-strategy equilibria exist for these realisations.
These are such that the two firms mix over a common support - that lies above marginal costs
10In particular, we find that consumer surplus is concave in P , increasing in P at P = c, and decreasing in P
at P = v. It follows that consumer surplus is maximized at some P˜ ∈ (c, v).
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−
θ
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+
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−
0
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P [θ − k−]
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−
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][θ − k−]0
P [θ − k−]
Pk
−
1
Figure 5: Profits in the discriminatory auction
and includes the market reserve price - but according to different probability distributions; in
particular, only the large firm plays the upper bound, P , with positive probability. Since, with
probability 1, the small firm bids below that level, profits of the large firm are the same as if
it offered to sell residual demand (when the capacity of the small firm is fully despatched) at
P . Figure 5 summarises profit realisations.
Expected profits of the small and the large firms, respectively, are
pid−i = P
 k
+∫
k−
k−
θ
[
θ − k−] dθ + K∫
k+
k−
k+
[
θ − k−] dθ + 1∫
K
k−dθ
− ck−
pid+i = P
 k
+∫
k−
[
θ − k−] dθ + K∫
k+
[
θ − k−] dθ + 1∫
K
k+dθ
− ck+
The effect of a marginal increase in capacity becomes,
∂pid−i
∂ki
= P
K∫
ki
[
θ − 2ki
min {θ, kj}
]
dθ + P [1−K]− c (6)
∂pid+i
∂ki
= P [1−K]− c (7)
Changes in capacities affect the intensity of competition for a given demand realisation, thus
affecting profits. Changes in capacities also alter the probability of playing the different types of
equilibria; however, unlike in the uniform-price auction, since profits are everywhere continuous
in the demand parameter θ, these changes do not affect expected profits. Accordingly, as can
be seen from (7), the large firm benefits from marginal increases in its capacity with probability
12
1 − K, since it only sells at capacity when demand exceeds aggregate capacity. An increase
in the small firm’s capacity has additional effects on its profits whenever demand is below
aggregate capacity: (i) it allows the small firm to expand output when it prices below the rival;
(ii) however, as this also makes the large firm more aggressive, the probability that the small
firm sells at capacity is reduced. The overall additional effect on the small firm’s profits from
an increase in its capacity may be positive or negative, depending on the relative strength of
these two effects.
The following result characterises equilibrium investment behaviour in the discriminatory
auction.
Proposition 4 In the discriminatory auction,
(i) there are exactly two pure-strategy equilibria in capacity choices, one with (k1, k2) =(
kd+, kd−
)
and the other with (k1, k2) =
(
kd−, kd+
)
, where kd+ = αkd− with α > 2 given
implicitly by the equation
α2 − 2α ln (α) = 3
2
. (8)
(ii) Aggregate equilibrium capacity is Kd = 1− cP .
As in the uniform-price auction, we find that, even though firms are symmetric ex ante,
equilibrium behaviour is asymmetric; in particular, one firm chooses a capacity that is more
than twice the size of that of its rival. Furthermore, the two equilibria are outcome equivalent,
with the same aggregate capacity and expected prices.
Equilibrium profits become
pid−i = 0.11P
[
1− cP
]2
pid+i = 0.25P
[
1− cP
]2
Also in this auction, the larger firm is more profitable; indeed, here the larger firm’s profit is
more than twice that of its smaller rival. As in the uniform-price auction, we find that profits,
capacities and total welfare are increasing in the market reserve price, P , while consumer
surplus reaches its maximum for some intermediary value P˜ ∈ (c, v).
2.3 Uniform-Price versus Discriminatory
Having characterised equilibria for the two auction formats, we turn to a comparison of equi-
librium outcomes.
Proposition 5
(i) Aggregate capacity is 1− cP in both auctions. Hence, unless P = v, both auction formats
result in under-investment relative to the first best.
(ii) The discriminatory auction results in more capacity asymmetry than the uniform-price
auction.
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(iii) Expected prices are higher in the uniform-price auction than in the discriminatory
auction.
The two auction formats result in the same level of aggregate investment. Unless the market
reserve price P is set equal to consumers’ per-unit gross utility v, the marginal return to extra
capacity is below the social benefit; hence, there is under-investment relative to the first best.
The distribution of aggregate capacity across firms differs between auction formats. While
in the uniform-price auction the capacity of the large firm is 1.5 times that of the small firm, in
the discriminatory auction the large firm has more than double the capacity of the small firm.
Since the small firm is larger in the uniform-price auction, the incidence of Low Demand
realisations is higher. Taken in isolation, this effect implies that prices tend to be lower in
the uniform-price auction than in the discriminatory auction. However, for High Demand
realisations competition is fiercer and price lower in the discriminatory action than in the
uniform-price auction. The relative importance of these two different and opposing effects
depends on the relative incidence of Low Demand and High Demand realisations. With a
uniform demand distribution, the latter effect outweighs the former and hence expected prices
are lower in the discriminatory auction than in the uniform-price auction.
Lastly, given that total welfare is a function of aggregate capacity only, both auction formats
result in the same level of total welfare. However, in expectation consumer surplus is higher
in the discriminatory auction since it leads to lower prices. Since the difference in profits is
increasing in the market reserve price, the gain to consumers from moving from the uniform-
price to the discriminatory format is greater the higher is P .
3 Extensions and Variations
In the previous section we have compared equilibria of the uniform-price and discriminatory
auctions under a number of simplifying assumptions. In this section we extend the analysis by
considering various alternative formulations, thereby not only casting light on the importance
of the assumptions underlying the basic model, but also allowing for a discussion of how the
comparison across auction formats depends on market characteristics.
3.1 Equilibrium Selection
The above analysis of the uniform-price auction was limited to pure-strategy equilibria, and,
moreover, based on the assumption that, for demand realisations where multiple pure-strategy
equilibria exist at the price-competition stage, firms are equally likely to play either of these.
In this section we characterise and discuss alternative equilibria of the uniform-price auction.
The assumption that firms are equally likely to play either of the two possible pure-strategy
equilibria at the price-competition stage was chosen to maximise the ex ante symmetry of firms,
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thereby highlighting the underlying mechanism that drives the asymmetric capacity outcome.
This equilibrium may be justified by assuming that firms adopt the following coordination
mechanism: they toss a coin and, if heads come up, they play the equilibrium in which Firm
1 bids at P, whereas if tails come up they play the equilibrium in which Firm 2 bids at P.11
It turns out that the analysis may be straightforwardly extended to the case in which, at the
outset of the second stage of the game, firms observe the outcome of a public signal, ρ˜, uniformly
distributed on [0, 1] , which allows them to coordinate on either of the two price equilibria.12
Specifically, in High Demand Region II, an equilibrium in which firm i bids high is played
whenever ρ˜ ≤ ρ, where ρ is a constant independent of installed capacity levels. Without loss
of generality, we set i = 1 for all ρ ≤ 12 , so that the probability with which Firm 2 bids high is
1− ρ. Note that setting ρ = 0 corresponds to assuming that, wherever relevant, firms play the
equilibrium at which Firm 2 bids at P . The following result generalises Proposition 2:
Proposition 6 In the uniform-price auction,
(i) there exists ρˆ ∈ (0, 12), such that if ρ ∈ [0, ρˆ), there is a unique pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium in capacity choices; it has the form
(
ku+1 , k
u−
2
)
. Otherwise, if ρ ∈ [ρˆ, 12], there are
exactly two pure-strategy equilibria in capacity choices, one with
(
ku+1 , k
u−
2
)
and the other with(
ku−1 , k
u+
2
)
. In either case,
ku+1 =
2− ρ
3− ρ
[
1− c
P
]
> ku−2 =
1
3− ρ
[
1− c
P
]
ku−1 =
1
2 + ρ
[
1− c
P
]
< ku+2 =
1 + ρ
2 + ρ
[
1− c
P
]
(ii) Aggregate equilibrium capacity is Ku = 1− cP .
There always exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in which one firm - here called Firm
1 - invests more than its rival. For a range of values of the parameter ρ, this equilibrium is
unique. For other parameter values, there exists another pure-strategy equilibrium in which
the other firm - Firm 2 - invests more.
In any equilibrium, independently of the value of ρ, aggregate capacity equals 1− cP . The
degree of capacity asymmetry however depends on which equilibrium is played, as well as on the
value of ρ. For ρ = 12 , the two equilibrium outcomes mirror each other, i.e., k
u+
1 = k
u+
2 > k
u−
1 =
ku−2 . For smaller ρ, Firm 1 is less likely to bid high and hence has a larger probability of being
despatched at full capacity; therefore its incentive to expand capacity is larger. Consequently,
11Since both strategy profiles constitute a Nash equilibrium, such a random coordination on each of them is
also an equilibrium. This is the idea that underlies the concept of correlated equilibrium proposed by Aumann
(1974).
12A public randomizing device in the second stage expands the set of Nash equilibria, so that any convex
combination of the Nash equilibria in the second stage is an equilibrium. This allows firms to achieve any point
in the convex hull of the set of continuation payoffs. Furthermore, firms play a continuation game with payoffs
on the Pareto frontier of the convex hull.
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as ρ is reduced, Firm 1 becomes larger, and Firm 2 correspondingly smaller, leading to more
asymmetry if
(
ku+1 , k
u−
2
)
is played, but less asymmetry if
(
ku−1 , k
u+
2
)
is played. When ρ = 0 -
that is, when firms coordinate on the equilibrium in which Firm 1 never plays high - capacity
asymmetry is at its maximum; here Firm 1 is twice as large as Firm 2.
Expected price depends on the size of the small firm only; the larger it is, the higher is
the probability that price equals marginal costs rather than the market reserve price P . If the
equilibrium
(
ku+1 , k
u−
2
)
is played, expected price is decreasing in ρ, whereas if
(
ku−1 , k
u+
2
)
is
played it is increasing in ρ. Since, for ρ = 12 , expected prices are the same in both equilibria, it
follows that when ρ < 12 the
(
ku+1 , k
u−
2
)
-equilibrium results in a higher expected price than the(
ku−1 , k
u+
2
)
-equilibrium. In other words, prices tend to be higher when it is more likely that an
equilibrium is played in which the small firm prices high, because this decreases the incentive
of the small firm to expand its capacity, thereby reducing the range of demand realisations at
which the price is competed down to marginal cost.
We conclude that aggregate investment, and therefore total welfare, do not depend on
whether firms coordinate on one of the pure-strategy equilibria or on whether they play both
with positive probability. Market concentration is lower when firms play a correlated equi-
librium because such an equilibrium involves weaker incentives for the large firm to expand
capacity. The increase in the relative size of the small firm, which implies greater incidence of
Low Demand realisations, tends to reduce prices; in particular, prices are at their lowest when
both firms are equally likely to bid high, i.e., when ρ = 12 . Since even in this case - as expressed
in Proposition 5 above - the uniform-price auction results in higher prices and lower consumer
surplus than the discriminatory auction, it follows that this result holds independently of which
equilibrium is considered.
So far the analysis of the uniform-price auction has been made under two restrictions: first,
we have concentrated on pure-strategy equilibria at which the pricing strategies do not depend
on the first-stage capacity choices; second, we have restricted attention to pure-strategy price
equilibria. Regarding the first restriction, we could instead have considered a case in which
the large firm always bids high for demand realisations where multiple pure-strategy equilibria
exist at the price-competition stage. However, this assumption introduces a discontinuity in
firms’ profit function at symmetric capacity pairs, with piu−i (k, k)−piu+i (k, k) = P2 k2 > 0. Such
a discontinuity results in the non-existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium in capacity choices,
as either firm would always prefer to invest slightly less than its rival. Nevertheless, at any
mixed-strategy equilibria in capacity choices, it would still be true that aggregate capacity in
the uniform-price auction is 1− cP .13
Regarding the second restriction, if firms play a mixed-strategy equilibrium at the price-
competition stage for demand realisations in High Demand Region II, the qualitative nature of
13Conditionally on being the large firm, the first- order condition under this equilibrium selection criterion is
the same as (5).
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the equilibrium of the overall game is essentially the same as when we consider pure-strategies
only. This last result on equilibrium selection is summarised in the following Proposition.
Proposition 7 In the uniform-price auction, when demand is high, there also exist mixed-
strategy equilibria at the price-competition stage. When firms play a mixed-strategy equilibrium
for High Demand realisations in Region II, equilibria in the overall game have the same quali-
tative characteristics as when firms play (correlated) pure strategies. In particular,
(i) equilibrium capacities are asymmetric;
(ii) aggregate equilibrium capacity is Ku = 1− cP ;
(iii) for a given capacity configuration, industry profits and prices are lower than when firms
play (correlated) pure strategies;
(iv) industry profits and prices are nevertheless higher than in the discriminatory auction.
There turns out to be a very close connection between the set of correlated equilibria
and the set of mixed-strategy equilibria. In particular, as far as capacity configurations are
concerned, each outcome in a correlated equilibrium corresponds to an outcome in a mixed-
strategy equilibrium, and vice versa. In other words, whether firms randomise over which firm
should bid high and which firm should bid low, or whether each firm individually randomises
over its choice of bid, is immaterial as far as investment incentives are concerned.14
3.2 Long-Lived Bids
In the basic model, it was assumed that price competition took place after demand was realised
and observed. The assumption that firms know demand when they set prices is a reasonable
approximation for markets in which prices are set for short periods of time, say for hourly
or half -hourly periods. Given the relatively high persistence of demand and the very high
accuracy with which demand can be forecasted, market players will in effect be able to foresee
the level of demand when they prepare their bids. However, in markets in which prices are set
for longer periods of time - say, for a whole day - demand will typically vary considerably over
the pricing period; the assumption that demand is fixed and known is then not appropriate.
In this subsection we consider instead a variant of the model in which bids are made before
demand is realised. We term this bidding format ‘long-lived bids’.15 Equilibrium at the pricing
stage may then be characterised as follows:
14The fact that the mixed-strategy equilibria generate lower profits but the same aggregate capacity as the
pure or correlated equilibria provides an additional example of how investment incentives depend on marginal
profits rather than profits per se.
15Note that this amounts to assuming that the variation in demand over the pricing period corresponds to
that over the lifetime of investment. In practice, demand may vary over the day (a typical pricing period),
as well as between seasons and years. Taking account of different types of demand variation would require a
multi-period set up.
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Proposition 8 Suppose bids are made before demand is realised. Under both auction formats,
for given capacities ki ≤ kj ≤ 1, there does not exist a pure-strategy equilibrium. In the
unique mixed-strategy equilibrium, firms choose prices from a common support, with a lower
bound strictly above (zero) marginal costs and an upper bound equal to P . If ki 6= kj, the
firm with the larger capacity bids less aggressively (i.e., plays prices below any threshold with
lower probability) than the firm with the smaller capacity; in particular, the firm with the larger
capacity plays P with positive probability.
Equilibrium differs substantially from the case in which demand is known with certainty
before prices are set. In particular, two forces destroy any candidate pure-strategy equilibrium:
on the one hand, a higher price translates into higher profits if demand turns out to exceed
aggregate capacity; on the other hand, pricing high reduces a firm’s expected sales (Fabra, von
der Fehr and Harbord, 2006). Therefore, the only equilibrium is in mixed strategies.
At the unique equilibrium, the large firm plays a mass point at P , so that it receives the
same profits as if it served residual demand at P with probability one (these profits are the
same as in the discriminatory auction with short-lived bids). The small firm’s profits differ
substantially from the profits it makes with short-lived bids. Nevertheless, it preserves features
that account for the non-existence of a symmetric equilibrium in capacity choices; in particular,
the small firm’s returns to investment are lower than those of the large firm, since the small
firm takes into account that an increase in its capacity would affect the aggressiveness of the
pricing behaviour of its rival.
The following proposition characterises equilibrium capacity choices in the uniform-price
and discriminatory auctions with long-lived bids.
Proposition 9 Under each auction format, there exist exactly two pure-strategy equilibria in
capacity choices, one with (k1, k2) = (ka+, ka−) and the other with (k1, k2) = (ka−, ka+), where
ka− < ka+, and a = d, u denotes discriminatory and uniform-price format, respectively. At
equilibrium, aggregate capacity is Ka = 1− cP , a = d, u.
The next proposition compares equilibrium outcomes across pricing formats.
Proposition 10 When bids are made before demand is realised, the discriminatory auction
generates the same aggregate capacity, it induces a more skewed capacity distribution and it
results in lower expected prices than the uniform-price auction.
The comparison across auction formats therefore corresponds to that with short-lived bids,
(Proposition 5). However, the fact that the discriminatory auction performs better than the
uniform-price auction contrasts with results for the case in which capacities are taken as given.
With ex-ante symmetric firms, fixed capacities and long-lived bids, the uniform-price and the
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discriminatory auctions yield equal expected prices (Fabra, von der Fehr and Harbord, 2006);
when capacities are endogenous, this is no longer the case.
We end by comparing equilibrium outcomes across bid formats.
Proposition 11 Comparing equilibrium outcomes when bids are made, respectively, before and
after demand is realised, we find:
(i) Aggregate capacity is the same and equals 1− cP in all cases.
(ii) With the uniform-price format, the distribution of capacity is more skewed when bids
are made before demand is realised iff Pc > 1.22 (or
c
P ≤ 0.82). With the discriminatory format,
the distribution of capacity is more skewed when bids are made before demand is realised iff
P
c > 12.71 (or
c
P < 0.08).
(iii) Under both auction formats, aggregate profits - and hence expected prices - are higher
when bids are made before demand is realised.
Bid duration does not have an impact on overall capacity, and hence on total welfare.
Nevertheless, it alters the way in which total capacity is distributed among firms, thereby
affecting market concentration. In perhaps the most relevant case, when the market reserve
price is close, but not very close, to capacity costs (specifically, 1.22 < Pc < 12.71), moving from
short-lived to long-lived bids tends to reduce the difference between the two auction formats;
the capacity distribution becomes less concentrated under the discriminatory format - where
concentration tends to be higher in any case - and more concentrated under the uniform-price
format - where concentration is less.
A move from short-lived to long-lived bids does however increase profits - and hence con-
sumer prices - under both auction formats. It follows that the combination of a reasonable
price cap, short-lived bids and the discriminatory format produces the most favourable outcome
from consumers’ point of view.
3.3 Price-Responsive Demand
So far we have restricted attention to the case in which demand is completely price inelastic,
both in the short and in the long run. In this subsection we extend the basic model by intro-
ducing a long-term demand function that depends on retail price. For analytical convenience,
we assume aggregate demand has the multiplicative form θD (p), where D is a deterministic
function, decreasing in consumer or retail price, p, and (as before) θ is a stochastic parameter
uniformly distributed on the unit interval.
While with a price-inelastic formulation it is not essential to specify the exact form of
consumer payments, here we need to be explicit about the determination of retail price. We
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assume that retail price is set so that the market clears in average or expected terms:
p
 K/D(p)∫
0
θD (p) dθ +
1∫
K/D(p)
Kdθ
 = pi1 + pi2 + cK. (9)
Clearly, for given capacities an auction format that leads to lower payments to producers will
result in lower retail prices, more demand and hence higher welfare.
To understand how price-responsiveness of demand may affect investment incentives, con-
sider first the impact on the profit of the large firm from a marginal increase in its capacity
under the discriminatory format:
∂pid+i
∂k+
= P
∂p
∂k+
K/D(p)∫
k−/D(p)
θD′ (p) dθ + P
[
1− K
D (p)
]
− c.
Comparing with the case in which demand is price-inelastic (cf. (7) above), there are now
additional effects. Firstly, as captured by the second element on the right-hand side in the
above expression, the probability that the marginal unit of capacity is despatched depends on
the level of demand and hence on the market price; the lower is the price, the higher is the
probability that capacity will be fully utilised.
Secondly, as captured by the first element in the above expression, there is what we may
term a ‘market-size’ effect; that is, capacity affects retail price and hence demand. Whether
this effect tends to stimulate or to depress investment incentives depends on whether increases
in the large firm’s capacity tend to reduce or increase retail price; that is, it depends on the
sign of ∂p
∂k+
. The link between capacities and retail price is complex; an increase in capacities
allow for an expansion of consumption (cf. the left-hand side of (9)), but also raises total costs
and affect producers’ profits (cf. the right-hand side of (9)); the overall impact on the retail
price depends on which of these effects dominates. We have not been able to derive general
results on the relation between capacities and retail price, but, as we explain below, numerical
simulations for a linear specification suggests that an increase in capacities is associated with
a fall in retail price. If so, the market-size effect tends to enhance investment incentives.
In the uniform-price auction, an increase in the large firm’s capacity unambigously raises
retail price, implying that overall capacity will be smaller when demand is price-elastic than
when it is not. Specifically, the impact on the profit of the large firm of a marginal increase in
its capacity may be written
∂piu+i
∂k+
= P
dp
dk+
1
2
 k−k+
[D (p)]2
D′ (p) +
K/D(p)∫
k+/D(p)
θD′ (p) dθ
+ P [1− K
D (p)
]
− c.
In addition to the effects identified above for the discriminiatory auction, for the uniform-price
auction we find that price-responsiveness of demand also affects delineation of different spot-
market outcomes. In particular, as price increases and demand falls following an expansion of
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the large firm’s capacity, the relative incidence of demand realisations in High Demand Region
I is increased while that of High Demand Region II is reduced. Since the large firm earns a
higher profit in Region II (where it may be despatched at full capacity) than in Region I (where
it serves residual demand only), this effect tends to discourage investments even further.
To gain some further insight into the possible direction and magnitude of the effects in-
volved, we have analysed a linear specification of the demand function; in particular, we let
D (p) = 1− γp (note that γ = 0 corresponds to the case with inelastic demand). We have per-
formed a series of numerical simulations which show that, with this specification, an increase in
the large firm’s capacity induces a reduction in the retail price in the discriminatory auction.
Hence, whereas the market-size effect tends to discourage investments in the uniform-price
auction, it has the opposite effect in the discriminatory auction. Investment incentives are
further strengthened in the discriminatory auction as compared to the uniform-price auction
by the fact that under the former auction format retail prices are lower. These two results lead
to both higher consumer surplus and overall welfare in the discriminatory auction than in the
uniform-price auction.
The figures below depict aggregate capacity and retail prices as a function of the slope of the
demand function for the case in which c/P = 0.1. As can be seen, the discriminatory auction
induces more aggregate investment and lower retail prices than the uniform-price auction, and
the differences between the two become larger the more elastic is the demand function.
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Figure 6: Aggregate capacity (left) and expected prices (right) as a function of γ
3.4 Distribution of Demand
In the basic model, it was assumed that demand is uniformly distributed. In this section, we
relax this assumption. Since price competition takes place after demand has been realised and
observed, characterisation of equilibrium bidding behaviour remains as in Propositions 1 and 3
for the uniform-price and discriminatory auctions, respectively. We may therefore concentrate
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our attention on the stage where capacities are chosen.
In the analysis of the basic model we saw how the marginal impact of investment on profits
could be decomposed into a number of distinct and partly off-setting effects. First, investment
allows for an increase in output whenever capacity acts as a constraint. Second, investment
affects the type of equilibrium being played, by moving the borders between different regions
of demand. In the discriminatory auction, there is a third effect also; investment affect the
intensity of price competition when demand is High. The overall impact of investment depends
on the relative importance of these effects, which further depends on the distribution of demand;
the distribution determines the likelihood with which demand falls into different regions and
hence the relative weight on each type of effect.
While equilibrium analysis is essentially the same with a general demand distribution as
with the uniform distribution, it does become rather involved; in particular, existence of pure-
strategy equilibrium is not guaranteed.16 This may be seen as being due to the fact that
reaction functions are not well behaved; not only are they not continuous (as with the uniform
demand distribution), but they may also slope in different directions. We refer to the Appendix
for details on equilibrium characterisation; here we concentrate attention on the total capacities
that result at equilibrium.
The following proposition compares aggregate equilibrium capacities across auction formats,
as well as with the first-best:
Proposition 12 Suppose demand is distributed according to the function G on [0, 1]. Then,
when a pure-strategy equilibrium in capacities exists, the following is true:
(i) Kd ≤ KFB, where the inequality is strict for P < v.
(ii) If G is strictly concave, Ku < Kd.
(iii) If G is strictly convex, Kd < Ku. Moreover, there exists P̂ ∈ (c, v), such that if
P < P̂ , Ku < KFB, and if P > P̂ , KFB < Ku.
The relative size of installed capacities in the uniform-price and discriminatory auctions de-
pends on whether the demand distribution function is concave or convex; when the distribution
function is concave, the uniform-price auction induces lower investment than the discriminatory
auction, and vice versa.
To understand this result, consider the effect on the profit of the large firm from a marginal
increase in its capacity for the uniform-price and discriminatory formats, respectively:
∂piu+
∂k+
= P [1−G (K)]− c+ P
2
[
G (K)−G (k+)−G′ (k+) k−] (10)
∂pid+
∂k+
= P [1−G (K)]− c (11)
16As shown in the Appendix, the following are sufficient conditions for equilibrium existence: either G is
convex, or G is concave and G′ is convex. These properties are satisfied by a large family of distribution
functions.
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In both cases, a marginal increase in the large firm’s capacity allows it to sell more output
at P whenever demand exceeds aggregate capacity. As may be seen from (11), in the discrim-
inatory auction the firm balances this effect, P [1−G (K)], against the unit cost of capacity,
c, and this determines aggregate investment.
As seen from (10), in the uniform-price auction there are additional effects. Firstly, when
the large firm increases its capacity it enlarges the range of demand realisations over which,
with probability 12 , it is bidding high and is despatched with only part of its capacity; the
corresponding loss of profit is captured by the term −G′(k+)k−. Secondly, in the event that
demand is in the range [k+,K], the firm is despatched at full capacity and hence a marginal
increase in its capacity induces a gain in profit equal to G(K) − G(k+). Whether investment
incentives are weaker or stronger in the uniform-price auction as compared to in the discrimina-
tory auction depends on the relative importance of these two effects; in particular, it depends
on the relative frequency of demand realisations on the interval [k+,K], or, more precisely,
on the sign of G (K)−G (k+)−G′ (k+) k−, which is determined by the shape of the demand
distribution function G. For example, when G is concave, the total gain from being able to
increase output by one unit for each realisation of demand in the range [k+,K] - which has
length k− - is smaller than the loss from having to reduce output by k− in the event that
demand equals k+; therefore, investment incentives are weaker in the uniform-price auction
than in the discriminatory auction. The reverse is true when G is convex.
This discussion should also help understanding the comparison with first best. Indepen-
dently of how demand is distributed, the discriminatory auction results in underinvestment
because the large firm does not capture the entire social gain of its investment unless the price
at which the extra capacity is sold equals consumers’ willingness to pay, i.e., P = v.
In the uniform-price auction, market performance relative to the First Best depends on
how demand is distributed also. For P = v, so that market price reflects the social value
of capacity, underinvestment results if G is concave, whereas overinvestment results if G is
convex. If P < v, investment incentives are lower in either case. If G is concave, a reduction
in P strengthens the underinvestment result; if G is convex, overinvestment is mitigated, and
ultimately eliminated as P is reduced to P̂ . For P < P̂ , the uniform-price auction results in
underinvestment also for a convex distribution function.
Proposition 12 has immediate implications for the welfare ranking of the two auction for-
mats:
Corollary 1 At equilibrium, the comparison of total welfare is as follows:
(i) If G is strictly concave, W u < W d.
(ii) If G is strictly convex, there exists P ∈
(
P̂ , v
)
such that if P ≤ P , W d ≤ W u and
W u < W d otherwise.
If the demand distribution function is concave, the discriminatory auction induces a more
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efficient outcome than the uniform-price auction, independently of the value of P . Furthermore,
with a discriminatory auction first best may be attained by setting P = v, whereas with a
uniform-price auction under-investment cannot not be avoided.
If the demand distribution is convex, the welfare ranking depends on the level of the market
reserve price P . If P ≤ P̂ , the uniform-price auction induces a more efficient outcome in
the sense that aggregate capacity is closer to the first-best level. As P is raised above P̂ ,
welfare decreases in the uniform-price auction since over-investment results, but increases in
the discriminatory as the degree of under-investment is mitigated. Hence there exists some
price level P such that for P > P it is less costly is terms of welfare losses to ration demand
than to finance the over-investment that results in the uniform-price auction. Both auction
formats would result in an efficient level of installed capacity if the market reserve price is set at
the right level: this level is P = P in the uniform-price auction and P = v in the discriminatory
auction. Note that while the market reserve price that induces first-best investment is lower in
the uniform-price than in the discriminatory action, prices may still be higher in the uniform-
price auction.
Given the importance of the shape of the demand distribution function, it is relevant to
ask what real distribution functions look like. The figure below depicts demand distribution
functions for the Spanish electricity industry for each of the years 2002 to 2005.17 As can
be seen from Figure 7, the demand distribution function is convex for low demand values,
approximately uniform for intermediate demand values and concave for high demand values.
Our theoretical model indicates that, as far as overall capacity is concerned, the relevant range is
intermediate and high demand values. If so, these data suggest that the distribution of demand
is uniform or concave.18 The implication is that both auction formats lead to underinvestment,
but that performance is better with the discriminatory format, both with regard to investment
and average prices. Of course, given the highly stylised nature of our model, this result should
be taken with the necessary caution.
4 Conclusions
Fabra, von der Fehr and Harbord (2006) demonstrated that, in a model which captures essential
features of price setting in deregulated electricity markets, the discriminatory price format
consistently leads to lower prices than the uniform-price format. This analysis, which was based
on the assumption that installed capacities were given, suggested three sets of issues for future
17This demand distribution function has been constructed using the 35, 064 hourly demand values registered
in the Spanish electricity market from 2002 to 2005. These data are provided by the Market Operator, OMEL.
The precise shape of this function may change from year to year depending on factors such as weather, economic
activity, etc.
18As far as we know, the distribution of demand in other markets tend to have similar shapes.
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Figure 7: Demand Distribution Function in the Spanish Electricity Market, 2002-2005
research. First, given that market prices depend on the pricing format, and given that price
signals influence investment incentives, how does the choice of auction format affect capacity
investment? Second, does allowing for endogenous capacities affect the relative performance of
the two market designs? And, third, how do price caps - which mitigate market power but also
reduce the profitability of investment - affect overall market performance once the effects on
investment incentives is accounted for; in particular, is it still true that consumers are better
off the more stringent is the price cap?
In this paper, we have attempted to cast some light on these issues. Firstly, we have
demonstrated that, although the discriminatory auction generally leads to more competitive
behaviour and lower prices than the uniform-price auction, it is not necessarily the case that
incentives to invest are weaker; indeed, investment incentives may be greater with the dis-
criminatory format. Moreover, even under conditions of imperfect competition, market-based
incentives do not necessarily lead to under-investment; in fact, with the uniform-price format
over-investment may well occur. Nevertheless, aggregate investment is not necessarily affected
by the choice of either pricing rule or bid format; so long as demand is uniformly distributed
on the relevant range (which appears to be the empirically relevant case), total investment re-
mains the same. The intuition for this result follows from two observations: (i) at the margin,
capacity is always determined by a firm that in effect acts as a monopolist with respect to
residual demand; and (ii) the marginal unit is despatched when capacity is fully utilised, in
which case it receives the market reserve price under both auction formats.
On the second set of issues, relating to market performance, the relative supremacy of the
discriminatory auction as far as prices are concerned tends to be true even when we allow for
endogenous capacities. The dominant effect is the one identified by Fabra, von der Fehr and
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Harbord (2006), that, when demand is high, competition is fiercer in the discriminatory auction
than in the uniform-price auction. Allowing for endogenous capacity choice does however
introduce two new effects that may modify the conclusion. Firstly, a larger total capacity
generally reduces prices, especially when demand is close to full capacity utilisation; when the
discriminatory auction leads to higher investment, this effect enhances the supremacy of that
format, and vice versa. Secondly, more asymmetry between firms (which, for a given aggregate
capacity, means higher market concentration) tends to raise prices; when the discriminatory
auction leads to more asymmetry, this effect reduces the supremacy of that format, and vice
versa. The determinants of these additional effects are complex and the comparison across
formats depend on underlying market characteristics. However, with uniformly distributed
demand, while total capacity is the same and the asymmetry is greater with the discriminatory
auction, prices are nevertheless lower with that format.
On the third set of issues, the relationship between price caps and market performance
gets richer and probably more realistic once capacities are endogenised. Price caps have two
countervailing effects on consumers’ welfare. On the one hand, for given capacities, lowering the
price cap reduces equilibrium prices, thereby benefitting consumers; however, a lower price cap
also decreases firms’ incentives to expand capacity, leading to a greater likelihood of demand
rationing. It turns out that consumers may be made better off with a price cap than with
no price cap at all. It may be noted that the choice of price cap also affects the relative
performance of the two auction formats.
Admittedly, our model is highly stylised and we would not want to over-emphasise the
empirical relevance of the theoretical results. Nevertheless, some of the insights appear quite
robust and seem to point to more fundamental characteristics of the workings of deregulated
electricity markets. One of these has already been pointed out: although the discriminatory
auction format tends to lower prices, this does not imply that investment incentives are poorer;
profit-maximising firms are not concerned with profit levels per se, but how the level of profit
is affected by capacity choices.
A second apparently robust result is the asymmetry of investment incentives. By choosing
a smaller capacity than its rival, a firm can ensure a higher frequency of market outcomes at
which not only is price competition softer, but it itself is despatched at full capacity. At the
same time, a firm facing a relatively small rival has incentive to expand capacity so as to take
advantage of higher prices in periods of high demand. It may be noted that such asymmetric
investment incentives imply that incumbency size advantages may be maintained also after
market-based competition has taken effect. A natural question to analyse next is to which
extent the different auction formats favour investment by the current market leader, thereby
leading to increasing asymmetries in the long-run.19
19Athey and Schmutzler (2001) analyse a model of oligopolistic competition with ongoing investment and
derive conditions under which the leading firms invest more, thereby reinforcing their initial market dominance.
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Appendix
A The Basic Model
Proof of Propositions 2 and 6
As Proposition 2 is a special case of Proposition 6, we provide a general argument that covers
both cases.
Let ρi be the probability with which, when there exist multiple equilibrium outcomes at the
price-competition stage, an equilibrium in which firm i bids high is played. Recall that ρi is a
constant, independent of installed capacity levels, such that ρi = ρ ≤ 12 if i = 1 and ρi = 1− ρ
if i = 2.
Expected profits are given as follows, for i = 1, 2, i 6= j,
piui (ki, kj) =
{
piu−i if ki ≤ kj
piu+i if ki ≥ kj ,
where
piu−i = P
[
k+∫
k−
k−dθ +
K∫
k+
{[1− ρi] k− + ρi [θ − k+]} dθ +
1∫
K
k−dθ
]
− ck−
piu+i = P
[
k+∫
k−
[θ − k−] dθ +
K∫
k+
{[1− ρi] k+ + ρi [θ − k−]} dθ +
1∫
K
k+dθ
]
− ck+.
(12)
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Let k−i (kj) and k
+
i (kj) be (implicitly) defined as the solutions to the first-order conditions
∂piu−i (k−i (kj),kj)
∂ki
= 0 and
∂piu+i (k+i (kj),kj)
∂ki
= 0, respectively. Simple algebra shows that
k−i (kj) =
1
2 + ρi
[
1− c
P
]
, (13)
k+i (kj) = 1−
c
P
− kj . (14)
Note that since both piu−i (ki, kj) and pi
u−
i (ki, kj) are concave in ki and since pi
u
i is contin-
uous, it follows that k−i (kj) and k
+
i (kj) are local profit maximisers only if they are interior,
i.e., if k−i (kj) ≤ kj and k+i (kj) ≥ kj , respectively. There are three cases to consider: (a)
kj < k
−
i (kj) ≤ k+i (kj), so that only k+i (kj) supports a maximum; (b) k−i (kj) ≤ kj ≤ k+i (kj), so
that both k−i (kj) an k
+
i (kj) are local maximisers; and (c) k
−
i (kj) ≤ k+i (kj) < kj , so that only
k−i (kj) supports a maximum. Figure 4 depicts cases (a) and (c).
In case (b), a simple monotonicity argument - based on the observations that while piu−i
(
k−i (kj), kj
)
is a constant, independent of kj , piu+i (ki, kj) is strictly decreasing in kj - implies that there
exists some value k̂j such that piu−i
(
k−i (kj), kj
) ≥ piu+i (k+i (kj), kj) if and only if kj ≥ k̂j . From
the expressions
piu−i
(
k−i (kj), kj
)
=
1
2
1
2 + ρi
P
[
1− c
P
]2
piu+i
(
k+i (kj), kj
)
=
1
2
P
[
1− c
P
]2 − [P − c] kj + P2 [2− ρi] k2j
we find20
k̂j =
2 + ρi − ρi
√
2 + ρi
2− ρi
1
2 + ρi
[
1− c
P
]
.
Therefore, using (13) and (14), the best-reply function of firm i becomes
kui (kj) =
{
1− cP − kj if kj ≤ k̂j
1
2+ρi
[
1− cP
]
if kj ≥ k̂j
(15)
Note that kui is a continuous, non-increasing function everywhere on [0, 1], except at k̂j ,
where k−i
(
k̂j
)
≤ kˆj ≤ k+i
(
k̂j
)
(the inequalities are strict unless ρi = 0); in particular, for
kj ≥ k̂j the reaction function is flat, whereas for kj ≤ k̂j it is strictly decreasing in the rival’s
capacity. For ρ > 0, the discontinuity in the reaction function implies that it never crosses the
45◦-line.
Using the same parameter values as in the example above, Figure 8 depicts firms’ reaction
functions for ρ = 12 and ρ = 0.
Since, for a given value of ρ, at most one reaction function crosses the 45◦-line a symmetric
pure-strategy equilibrium cannot exist. Hence, at equilibrium, firms choose asymmetric capac-
ities. For a pure-strategy equilibrium with ki > kj to exist it must be the case that the flat part
20The second root in the equation piu−i
(
k−i (kj) , kj
)
= piu+i
(
k+i (kj) , kj
)
is ruled out by the condition kˆj ≤
1
2
P−c
P
.
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Figure 8: Best reply functions in the uniform auction for ρ = 12 (left) and ρ = 0 (right)
of firm j’s reaction function, k−j (ki), crosses the decreasing part of firm i’s reaction function,
k+i (kj), to the left of the discontinuity point k̂j ; that is, at such an equilibrium, k
−
j
(
k̂j
)
< k̂j .
Consider first the case ρ = 12 . Since, in this case, firms’ payoff functions are identical, their
best-reply functions are symmetric, with discontinuity at some k̂1 = k̂2 = k̂. Consequently, the
two reaction functions must cross at two points, (k+, k−) and (k+, k−), with k− < k̂ < k+.
As ρ is reduced below 12 , so that Firm 1 sells at capacity more frequently (and Firm 2
correspondingly less often), k−1 (k2) shifts up, k
−
2 (k1) shifts down, while both k
+
1 (k2) and k
+
2 (k1)
remain unaltered. It follows that, in (k1, k2)-space, the two crossing points move towards
South-East, implying that, at equilibrium, the capacity of Firm 1 increases, while that of Firm
2 decreases, as ρ is reduced. Note, however, that whereas the equilibrium with k1 > k2 exists
for all ρ ≤ 12 , the equilibrium with k1 < k2 fails to exist when ρ falls below a critical level,
ρ̂. We must have ρ̂ > 0, since, for ρ = 0, firms’ reaction functions cannot cross at any point
k1 < k2.
Proof of Proposition 4
In reduced form, we have
pid− = [P − c] k− − P [k−]2
[
1 + 12
k−
k+
− ln
(
k−
k+
)]
pid+ = [P − c] k+ − P
{
1
2 [k
+]2 + k−k+
} (16)
Note that pid− = pid+ at k− = k+. Moreover,
∂pid−
∂k−
= P − c− Pk−
[
1− 2 ln
(
k−
k+
)
+
3
2
k−
k+
]
∂pid+
∂k+
= P − c− P [k+ + k−]
30
and
∂2pid−
∂k−2
= P
[
1 + 2 ln
(
k−
k+
)
− 3k
−
k+
]
∂2pid+
∂k+2
= −P
Since ∂
2pid−
∂k−2 is increasing in k
− for k− ∈ (0, 23k+) and decreasing in k− for k− > 23k+, while
∂2pid−
∂k−2 < 0 at k
− = 23k
+, pid− is strictly concave in k−. Also pid+ is concave in k+. It follows
that firm i’s profit function is a piecewise concave function, continuous everywhere.
Let k−i (kj) and k
+
i (kj) be (implicitly) defined as the solutions to the first-order conditions
∂pid−(k−i (kj),kj)
∂ki
= 0 and
∂pid+(k+i (kj),kj)
∂ki
= 0, respectively. Simple algebra shows that k−i (kj)
solves
1− c
P
= ki
[
1− 2 ln
(
ki
kj
)
+
3
2
ki
kj
]
, (17)
while k+i (kj) is given by
k+i (kj) = 1−
c
P
− kj . (18)
Since both pid− (ki, kj) and pid+ (ki, kj) are concave in ki and since pidi is continuous, it follows
that k−i (kj) and k
+
i (kj) are local profit maximisers if they are interior, i.e., if k
−
i (kj) ≤ kj and
k+i (kj) ≥ kj , respectively. We first establish conditions under which k−i (kj) and k+i (kj) can
be interior. First, for k+i (kj) to be interior, we require kj ≤ 12
[
1− cP
]
. To see this, note that
k+i (kj) is downward sloping. Furthermore, if k
+
i (kj) = kj , (18) implies ki = kj =
1
2
[
1− cP
]
.
It follows that k+i (kj) ≥ kj iff kj ≤ 12
[
1− cP
]
.
Next, for k−i (kj) to be interior, we require kj ≥ 25
[
1− cP
]
. To see this note that k−i (kj) is
downward sloping, or
∂k−i (kj)
∂kj
=
2 kikj − 32
[
ki
kj
]2
1 + 2 ln
(
ki
kj
)
− 3 kikj
< 0,
since the numerator is positive, given that ki ≤ kj , and the denominator, which has the same
sign as ∂
2pid−
∂k−2 , is negative. Furthermore, if k
−
i (kj) = kj , (17) implies ki = kj =
2
5
[
1− cP
]
. It
follows that k−i (kj) ≤ kj iff kj ≥ 25
[
1− cP
]
.
There are three cases to consider: (a) kj < k−i (kj) ≤ k+i (kj), so that only k+i (kj) supports
a maximum; (b) k−i (kj) ≤ kj ≤ k+i (kj), so that both k−i (kj) an k+i (kj) are local maximisers;
and (c) k−i (kj) ≤ k+i (kj) < kj , so that only k−i (kj) supports a maximum. The three alternative
cases may therefore be delineated as follows: (a)kj < 25
[
1− cP
]
; (b)251 − cP ≤ kj ≤ 12
[
1− cP
]
; and (c) kj > 12
[
1− cP
]
. Clearly, in regions (a) and (b), given the continuity of the profit
function, the global maxima are the interior solutions k+i (kj) in (a) and k
−
i (kj) in (c).
In region (b), where both maxima are interior, we compare profits at the two candidate
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Figure 9: Best reply functions in the discriminatory auction
solutions. Since
pid−
(
k−i
(
2
5
[
1− c
P
])
,
2
5
[
1− c
P
])
− pid+
(
k+i
(
2
5
[
1− c
P
])
,
2
5
[
1− c
P
])
≤ 0 and
pid−
(
k−i
(
1
2
[
1− c
P
])
,
1
2
[
1− c
P
])
− pid+
(
k+i
(
1
2
[
1− c
P
])
,
1
2
[
1− c
P
])
≥ 0,
and by the continuity of the profit functions, there exists kˆj such that
pid−
(
k−i
(
kˆj
)
, kˆj
)
− pid+i
(
k+i
(
kˆj
)
, kˆj
)
= 0.
At kj = kˆj both k−i and k
+
i are global maximisers and hence best replies. For values kj < kˆj the
best reply is k+i , whereas for kj > kˆj the best reply is k
−
i . The uniqueness of kˆj is guaranteed
by the fact that the difference in profits is a strictly increasing function in kj :
dpid−
(
k−i (kj) , kj
)
dkj
− dpi
d+
(
k+i (kj) , kj
)
dkj
= −P
2
{[
k−i (kj)
kj
]2 [
2kj − k−i (kj)
]− 2k+i (kj)
}
≥ −P
2
{[
2kj − k−i (kj)
]− 2kj} > 0
where the first inequality from the fact that in region (b) k−i (kj) ≤ kj ≤ k+i (kj).
In summary, the best-response function of firm i = 1, 2, i 6= j, is
kdi (kj) =
{
k+i (kj) if kj ≤ kˆ
k−i (kj) if kj ≥ kˆ
Note that kdi (kj) is discontinuous at kj = kˆ, where it jumps down from k
+
i
(
kˆ
)
> kˆ to k−i
(
kˆ
)
<
kˆ.
To establish the character of equilibria we use a geometric argument. We have that kd2 (0) =
1 − cP and limk1↑k̂ kd2 (k1) > k̂. Furthermore, if we let kd inv1 denote the inverse of kd1 , we have
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kd inv1 (A) = 1− cP , where A = kd1
(
1− cP
)
> 0, and kd inv1 (B) = k̂, where B = limk2↓k̂ k
d
1 (k2) <
k̂. Since reaction functions are everywhere decreasing, it follows that kd2 and k
d inv
1 must cross
once on the interval [A,B] and do not cross on either [0, A] or
[
B, k̂
]
. Therefore, there exists
exactly one equilibrium in
[
0, k̂
]
×
[
k̂, 1− cP
]
. A corresponding argument establishes that there
exists one equilibrium in
[
k̂, 1− cP
]
×
[
0, k̂
]
.
To finally characterise equilibria, let k+ = αk−, with α > 1. From the first-order condition
(18), we find
k− =
1
1 + α
[
1− c
P
]
. (19)
Furthermore, from this result and the first-order condition (17), we find α2−2α ln (α)− 32 = 0.
The left-hand side of this equation is negative for α = 1 and increasing in α for any α > 1 . It
follows that it has a unique solution, which is α ≈ 2.34.
Proof of Proposition 5
(i) The fact that aggregate equilibrium capacities coincide under the two auction formats derives
from the fact that the first-order conditions for the large firm’s capacity choice are the same,
equations (5) and (7) above.
(ii) From Proposition 2 it follows that ku+ = 32k
u−, while from Proposition 4 it follows that
kd+ > 2kd−. Since aggregate capacities are the same it follows that kd− < ku− < ku+ < kd+.
(iii) In the uniform-price auction, equilibrium capacities are
ku− =
2
5
[
1− c
P
]
and ku+ =
3
5
[
1− c
P
]
and so, by inserting these expressions into (20), we find that profits are
piu− =
10
50
P
[
1− c
P
]2
and piu+ =
11
50
P
[
1− c
P
]2
implying that aggregate profits are
piu− + piu+ =
21
50
P
[
1− c
P
]2
. (20)
In the discriminatory auction, equilibrium capacities are
kd− =
1
1 + α
[
1− c
P
]
and kd+ =
α
1 + α
[
1− c
P
]
where α is given by (8), and, so by inserting these expressions into (16), we find that profits
are
pid− =
{
1
1+α − 1[1+α]2
[
1 + 12α + ln (α)
]}
P
[
1− cP
]2
pid+ =
{
α
1+α − 1[1+α]2
[
α2
2 + α
]}
P
[
1− cP
]2
implying that aggregate profits are
pid− + pid+ =
{
1− 1
1 + α
− 1
[1 + α]2
[
1
2α
+ lnα+
α2
2
]}
P
[
1− c
P
]2
. (21)
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Since the bracketed term in (21) is smaller than 2150 , it follows that aggregate profits are
lower in the discriminatory auction than in the uniform-price auction.
Consumer payments equal total revenues of firms, which equals the sum of capacity costs
and profits. Since aggregate capacity is the same in both auctions, so are capacity costs. It
follows that consumer payments are higher in the uniform-price than in the discriminatory
action. Moreover, if we define the average price p as total payments divided by expected
consumption, that is,
p
 K∫
0
θdθ +
1∫
K
Kdθ
 = cK + pi1 + pi2,
it follows that it is lower in the discriminatory auction than in the uniform-price auction.
B Equilibrium Selection
Proof of Proposition 7
Fabra et al. (2006) demonstrate that a mixed-strategy equilibrium at the price-competition
stage when demand is in High Demand Region II has the form
F u1 (b) =
 A1
[
b
P
] θ−k1
k1+k2−θ for 0 < b < P
1 for b = P
F u2 (b) =
 A2
[
b
P
] θ−k2
k1+k2−θ for 0 < b < P
1 for b = P
where F ui (b) = Pr {bi ≤ b} denotes the mixed strategy of firm i, i = 1, 2, and either (i) A1 = 1
and 0 < A2 ≤ 1 or (ii) 0 < A1 ≤ 1 and A2 = 1.
Furthermore, for a given demand realisation in High demand-Region II, equilibrium profits
of firm i, i = 1, 2, are given by
P {Pr (bj = P ) ki + [1− Pr (bj = P )] [θ − kj ]} − cki,
or, equivalently,
P {(1−Aj) ki +Aj [θ − kj ]} − cki.
Note that for demand realisations in this region, within the class of equilibria in which
limb→P F u1 (b) = 1 (implying Pr (b1 = P ) = 0 or A1 = 1) total industry profits are maximised in
the limiting case Pr (b2 = P ) = 1 (which corresponds to A2 = 0), where profits are [P − c] k1
and P [θ − k1]− ck2,21 and they are minimised in the case Pr (b2 = P ) = 0 (which corresponds
21This is the same as in the corresponding pure-strategy equilibrium in which Firm 2 is always bidding high,
implying that profits in this pure-strategy equilibrium dominate those in any mixed-strategy equilibrium.
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to A2 = 1), where profits are P [θ − k2]− ck1 and P [θ − k1]− ck2. Corresponding results hold
for the other class of mixed-strategy equilibria.
Assuming that firms play one particular mixed-strategy equilibrium at the price-competition
stage, we find that, for a given capacity configuration, expected profits are, for i = 1, 2, i 6= j,
piui (ki, kj) =
{
piu−i if ki ≤ kj
piu+i if ki ≥ kj
where
piu−i = P
[
k+∫
k−
k−dθ +
K∫
k+
{[1− φi] k− + φi [θ − k+]} dθ +
1∫
K
k−dθ
]
− ck−
piu+i = P
[
k+∫
k−
[θ − k−] dθ +
K∫
k+
{[1− φi] k+ + φi [θ − k−]} dθ +
1∫
K
k+dθ
]
− ck+
and φi = 1− Pr (bj = P ) = Aj , i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
Comparing with (12) above, we see that here φi is analytically equivalent to ρi. Conse-
quently, best reply functions and equilibrium characterisations can be derived by appealing to
the proof of Proposition 6, leading us to the two solutions
(
ku+1 , k
u−
2
)
and
(
ku−1 , k
u+
2
)
, where
ku+1 =
1 + φ2
2 + φ2
[
1− c
P
]
> ku−2 =
1
2 + φ2
[
1− c
P
]
ku−1 =
1
2 + φ1
[
1− c
P
]
< ku+2 =
1 + φ1
2 + φ1
[
1− c
P
]
and either φ1 = 1 and 0 < φ2 ≤ 1 or 0 < φ1 ≤ 1 and φ2 = 1. As explained in the proof of
Proposition 6, for certain parameter values only one of these solutions constitute an equilibrium;
in particular, an equilibrium with k1 < k2 (k2 < k1) fails to exist when φ1 (φ2) is sufficiently
small.
Consequently, in all equilibria, aggregate capacity equals 1− cP . Moreover, capacity asym-
metry is larger when firms’ strategies are more symmetric. Consider for example the equilibrium
in which Firm 2 bids the reserve price with positive probability and Firm 1 does not; that is,
Pr (b1 = P ) = 0 and Pr (b2 = P ) ≥ 0, or φ1 ≤ 1 and φ2 = 1. Then the capacity of Firm 1 (the
small firm) is decreasing, and that of Firm 2 (the large firm) is increasing, as the probability
that Firm 2 plays the reserve price goes down (i.e., φ1 goes up). The difference in capacities is
maximised in the limiting case when Pr (b2 = P ) = 0, which corresponds to φ1 = 1, when the
capacity of Firm 2 is double that of Firm 1.
At the equilibrium
(
ku+1 , k
u−
2
)
, profits become
piu1 =
1
2
2 + 2φ2 + φ22 − φ1
[2 + φ2]
2
[P − c]
P
2
piu2 =
1
2
1
2 + φ2
[P − c]
P
2
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implying that industry profits are
piu1 + pi
u
2 =
1
2
4 + 3φ2 + φ22 − φ1
[2 + φ2]
2
[P − c]
P
2
. (22)
With 0 < φ1 ≤ 1 and φ2 = 1, (22) is minimised at the upper bound φ1 = 1, where
piu1 + pi
u
2 =
7
18
[P − c]
P
2
.
With φ1 = 1 and 0 < φ2 ≤ 1, (22) is minimised in the limit φ2 = 0, where
piu1 + pi
u
2 =
3
8
[P − c]
P
2
Since the bracketed term in (21) is smaller than 38 , it follows that also in these mixed-strategy
equilibria industry profits exceed those obtained in the discriminatory auction.
C Long-Lived Bids
Proof of Propositions 8 and 9
Uniform-Price Auction
Let F ui (b) = Pr {bi ≤ b} denote the equilibrium mixed-strategy of firm i, i = 1, 2, in the
uniform-price auction, with fui (b) = F
u′
i (b), and let S
u
i be the support of F
u
i . Standard argu-
ments imply that Su1∩ Su2 = [b, P ), bu ≥ c, and that F u1 and F u2 do not have mass points on
(bu, P ).
We concentrate our attention on the case in which k1 + k2 ≤ 1.22 Firm i’s profit, when
bidding b, may then be written
piui (b) = F
u
j (b)b
∫ 1
kj
min {θ − kj , ki} dθ +
∫ P
b
[∫ ki
0
bθdθ +
∫ 1
ki
υkidθ
]
dF uj (υ)− cki.
The first term on the right-hand side represents firm i’s profits in the event that the rival bids
below b, in which case firm i produces a positive quantity (limited by its installed capacity)
only when demand is above the capacity of the rival. The second term represents firm i’s
profits in the event that the rival bids above b. As given by the first element of this term, firm i
will then serve all demand at its own price when capacity is sufficient to satisfy all of demand.
Furthermore, as given by the second element, firm i will produce at full capacity and receive a
price determined by the rival’s bid in the event that demand exceeds firm i’s capacity.
On (bu, P ), strategies must satisfy the following differential equations:
F uj (b)
∫ 1
kj
min {ki, θ − kj} dθ +
[
1− F uj (b)
] ∫ ki
0
θdθ
−bfuj (b)
{∫ ki
0
θdθ +
∫ 1
ki
kidθ −
∫ 1
kj
min {ki, θ − kj} dθ
}
= 0
22It is easy to show that k1 + k2 > 1 will never be part of a subgame perfect equilibrium.
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On the interior of the support of the mixed strategies the net gain from raising the bid
marginally must be zero. The first element on the left-hand side represents the gain to a
firm from the resulting increase in price received in the event that demand exceeds the capac-
ity of the rival and the rival submits the lowest bid. The second element represents the gain to
a firm from the resulting increase in price in the event that demand is lower than its capacity
and the rival submits the highest bid. Lastly, the third term represents the loss from being
despatched with a smaller output: in case demand falls below the firm’s capacity, the loss of
output equals total demand; in case demand exceeds the firm’s capacity but remains below
aggregate capacity, the loss equals the difference between being despatched at full capacity and
serving residual demand only (i.e., ki −min {ki, θ − kj}).
The above expressions may alternatively be written
fuj (b)−
λj
b
F uj (b) =
βj
b
,
where
λj =
1− ki − kj
kj
βj =
1
2
ki
kj
which have solutions
F uj (b) = Ω
j [b]λj − βj
λj
,
where Ωj , j = 1, 2, are constants of integration. Note that, if ki ≤ kj , βi ≥ βj , λi ≥ λj and
βi
λi
≥ βjλj . Furthermore, β1 = β2 and λ1 = λ2 when k1 = k2.
Given the boundary condition F uj (b
u) = 0, these equations yield the mixed-strategy distri-
bution functions for b ∈ [b, P ):
F uj (b) =
βj
λj
{[
b
b
]λj
− 1
}
.
Let k− and k+ denote the capacities of the smaller and larger firm, respectively, and define
β−, β+, λ−, λ+, F− and F+ correspondingly. Then λ− ≥ λ+ and β−
λ− ≥ β
+
λ+
and therefore
lim
b↑P
F u−j (b) =
β−
λ−
{[
P
bu
]λ−
− 1
}
≥ β
+
λ+
{[
P
bu
]λ+
− 1
}
= lim
b↑P
F u+(b).
Since at most one player can bid P with positive probability, it follows that we must have
limb↑P F u+j (b) ≤ limb↑P F u−j (b) = 1. Then it is straightforward to verify that bu is given
37
uniquely by
bu = P
[
β−
λ− + β−
] 1
λ−
= P
[
k+
2− 2k− − k+
] k−
1−k−−k+
.
Substituting for bu, we find
F u−j (b) =
β−
λ−
{
λ− + β−
β−
[
b
P
]λ−
− 1
}
=
1
2
k+
1− k− − k+
2− k+ − 2k−k+
[
b
P
] 1−k−−k+
k− − 1
 ,
while F u+j (P ) = 1 and, for b ∈ [b, P ),
F u+j (b) =
β+
λ+

[
λ− + β−
β−
]λ+
λ−
[
b
P
]λ+
− 1

=
1
2
k−
1− k− − k+

[
2− k+ − 2k−
k+
] k−
k+
[
b
P
] 1−k−−k+
k+ − 1
 .
Equilibrium profits become
piu−i = P
[
Pr (bj < P )
∫ 1
kj
min {θ − kj , ki} dθ + Pr (bj = P )
∫ 1
0
min {θ, ki} dθ
]
− cki
piu+i = P
∫ 1
kj
min {ki, θ − kj} dθ − cki
where
Pr (bj < P ) = lim
b↑P
F u+j (b) .
Profits can also be expressed in terms of k− and k+as follows:
piu−i = Pk
−
1− 1
2
k− − 1
2
k−k+
1− k− − k+

[
2− 2k− − k+
k+
] k−
k+ − 1

− ck−
piu+i = Pk
+
[
1− k− − 1
2
k+
]
− ck+
We find
∂piu−i
∂ki
= P
1− k− − 1
2
k−k+ [2− k− − 2k+]
[1− k− − k+]2
[2− 2k− − k+
k+
] k−
k+ − 1
 (23)
− 1
2
[k−]2
1− k− − k+
[
2− 2k− − k+
k+
] k−
k+
[
ln
(
2− 2k− − k+
k+
)
− 2k
−
2− 2k− − k+
]− c
∂piu+i
∂ki
= P
[
1− k− − k+]− c
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Figure 10: g (k) for cP ∈ {.01, .1, .2, .3, .4, .5, .6., .7, .8, .9, .99}
The latter expression implies that at equilibrium aggregate capacity is the same as with
short-lived bids. Furthermore,
lim
ki↓k
∂piu+i (ki, k)
∂ki
− lim
ki↑k
∂piu−i (ki, k)
∂ki
= Pk
[
1 +
1
2
2− 3k
1− 2k ln
(
2− 3k
k
)]
> 0,
when 0 < 2k < 1, which rules out existence of symmetric equilibria.
Given the complexity of ∂pi
u−
i
∂k− , we have not been able to derive closed-form solutions for
equilibrium capacities. However, the problem may be solved by numerical methods. From the
condition ∂pi
u+
∂ku+
= 0, we have k+ = 1− cP − k− . We define g (k−) = 1P
∂piu−(k−,1− cP −k− )
∂k− . From
(23) we have that
g
(
k−
)
= 1− k− − 1
2
k−
[
1− cP − k−
] [
2 cP + k
−][
c
P
]2

[
1 + cP − k−
1− cP − k−
] k−
1− c
P
−k−
− 1
 (24)
−1
2
[k−]2
c
P
[
1 + cP − k−
1− cP − k−
] k−
1− c
P
−k−
[
ln
(
1 + cP − k−
1− cP − k−
)
− 2k
−
1 + cP − k−
]
− c
P
.
A necessary (albeit not sufficient) condition for an equilibrium to exist is that g is downward-
sloping and crosses the horizontal axis for some 0 ≤ k− ≤ 12 . Figure 10, which shows plots of g
for different values of cP (lines corresponding to higher values of
c
P lie below those corresponding
to lower values), demonstrates that this is indeed the case.
Discriminatory Auction
Firm i’s profit, when pricing at b, may be written
pidi (b) = b
{
F dj (b)
∫ 1
kj
min [θ − kj , ki] dθ +
[
1− F dj (b)
] ∫ 1
0
min [θ, ki] dθ
}
− cki.
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A necessary condition for firm i to be indifferent between any price in the support Sd is
that, for all b ∈ Sd, pidi (b) = pii, implying
F dj (b) =
pii+cki
b −
∫ 1
0 min [θ, ki] dθ∫ 1
kj
min [θ − kj , ki] dθ −
∫ 1
0 min [θ, ki] dθ
.
The boundary condition F dj (b
d) = 0 implies
pii + cki = bd
∫ 1
0
min [θ, ki] dθ,
and so
F dj (b) =
∫ 1
0 min [θ, ki] dθ∫ 1
0 min [θ, ki] dθ −
∫ 1
kj
min [θ − kj , ki] dθ
b− bd
b
=
1
2
2− ki
kj
b− bd
b
.
Let k− and k+ denote the capacities of the smaller and larger firm, respectively and de-
fine F d− and F d+ correspondingly. Then F d−(b) ≥ F d+(b). It follows that we cannot have
limb↑P F d+(b) = 1, since this would imply limb↑P F d−(b) ≥ 1, with strict inequality for k− < k+.
Consequently, we have the boundary condition limb↑P F d−(b) = 1, from which it follows that
bd = P
2− 2k− − k+
2− k+ .
Equilibrium profits become
pid− =
1
2
Pk−
2− k−
2− k+
[
2− 2k− − k+]− ck−
pid+ =
1
2
Pk+
[
2− 2k− − k+]− ck+
It follows that
∂pid−
∂k−
= P
[1− k−] [2− 2k− − k+]− k− [2− k−]
2− k+ − c (25)
∂pid+
∂k+
= P
[
1− k− − k+]− c
Note that
lim
ki↓k
∂pid+i (ki, k)
∂ki
− lim
ki↑k
∂pid−i (ki, k)
∂ki
= 2Pk
1− k
2− k > 0,
which rules out symmetric solutions. Now since best replies are everywhere decreasing functions
if an equilibrium with ki < kj exists, it will be unique. Indeed, such an equilibrium exists and
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Figure 11: The small firm’s capacity in the uniform-price auction (solid line) and in the dis-
criminatory auction (dashed line) with long-lived bids
closed-form solutions for equilibrium capacities are given by,
kd− =
1
2
[
2 +
c
P
−
√
2 + 4
c
P
+ 3
[ c
P
]2]
(26)
kd+ =
1
2
[
−3 c
P
+
√
2 + 4
c
P
+ 3
[ c
P
]2]
(27)
Proof of Proposition 10
The proof above shows that equilibrium aggregate capacity is the same under both auction
formats, and that it equals 1− cP in both cases. We next want to compare equilibrium capacities
and profits (and hence expected price) between the two auction formats. Figure 11, which plots
ku− (solid line) and kd− (dashed line), demonstrates that kd− < ku−.
We next want to compare equilibrium profits under the two formats. Total profits in the
discriminatory auction are
Πd
(
k−, k+
)
= pid− + pid+ =
1
2
P
[
2− 2k− − k+] [2− k−] k− + [2− k+] k+
2− k+ − c
[
k− + k+
]
Substituting for k− and k+ from (26) and (27) above, we find equilibrium profits in reduced
form:
Πd = P

1
4
[
c
P
+
√
2 + 4
c
P
+ 3
[ c
P
]2] [1 + 2 cP ]√2 + 4 cP + 3 [ cP ]2 − cP [5 + 4 cP ]
2 + 12
[
3 cP −
√
2 + 4 cP + 3
[
c
P
]2] (28)
− c
P
[
1− c
P
]}
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Figure 12: The difference between profits in the uniform-auction and the discriminatory auction
under long-lived bids
Total profits in the uniform-price auction are
Πu = P
[k− + k+]{1− 1
2
[
k− + k+
]}− 1
2
[k−]2 k+
1− k− − k+

[
2− 2k− − k+
k+
] k−
k+ − 1


−c [k− + k+]
Using the fact that, at equilibrium, k− + k+ = P−cc and k
+ = 1 − cP − k−, we may write
total profits as a function of k− alone:
Πu
(
k−
)
= P
[
1
2
{
1−
[ c
P
]2}
(29)
−1
2
[k−]2
[
1− cP − k−
]
c
P

[
1 + cP − k−
1− cP − k−
] k−
1− c
P
−k−
− 1
− cP [1− cP ]

Figure 12, which shows the difference between profits under the uniform-price and the
discriminatory format, demonstrates that profits - and hence prices - are higher with the
uniform-price format.
Proof of Proposition 11
We next turn to a comparison of equilibrium capacity choices and profits when bids are made,
respectively, before and after demand is realised. We start from the observation that aggregate
capacities are the same in both cases.
In the uniform-price auction, we rely on numerical methods. With short-lived bids, equi-
librium capacity of the small firm is given by 25
[
1− cP
]
, whereas with long-lived bids the
corresponding capacity is given implicitly by the equation g (k) = 0, where g is defined in (24)
above. Figure 13, which provides a plot of g
(
2
5
[
1− cP
])
, shows that g
(
2
5
[
1− cP
])
is negative
if and only if cP ≤ 0.82078. This - together with the fact that g is decreasing in k - implies
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Figure 13: The function g evaluated at 25
[
1− cP
]
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Figure 14: The difference between profits with long-lived and short-lived bids in the uniform-
price auction
that the equilibrium capacity choice of the small firm is smaller with long-lived bids than the
corresponding choice with short-lived bids when cP ≤ 0.82078, and vice versa.
Aggregate equilibrium profits with short-lived bids are given by 2150P
[
1− cP
]2, whereas with
long-lived bids, equilibrium profits are given by (29). Figure 14, which shows the difference
between profits with long-lived and short-lived bids, demonstrates that profits - and hence
average prices - are higher with long-lived bids.
For the discriminatory format, we can compare closed-form solutions for equilibrium ca-
pacity choices. With short-lived bids, equilibrium capacity of the small firm is given by
1
1+α
[
1− cP
]
, where α is the solution to the equation α2−2α ln (α) = 32 , or α ≈ 2.343164. With
long-lived bids, equilibrium capacity of the small firm is given by 12
[
2 + cP −
√
2 + 4 cP + 3
[
c
P
]2].
Figure 15 plots the difference between the capacity of the small firm with short-lived and long-
lived bids as a function of cP . As can be seen, small-firm capacity with short-lived bids exceeds
that with long-lived bids when cP < 0.07866, and vice versa.
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Figure 15: The difference between the capacity of the small firm with short-lived and long-lived
bids in the discriminatory auction
Aggregate profits are given by (21), or approximately 0.359 987P
[
1− cP
]2, when bids are
short-lived, whereas in the case of long-lived bids, aggregate profits are given by (28). Figure
16, which shows a plot of 1P
[
Πds −Πdl], demonstrates that profits - and hence prices - are
always lower with short-lived bids.
D Price-Responsive Demand
This section provides details on the equilibrium characterisation when demand is price-responsive.
Uniform-Price Auction
Profits for the small and the large firm are, respectively,
piu−i = P
 k
+
D(p)∫
k−
D(p)
k−dθ +
K
D(p)∫
k+
D(p)
{
1
2k
− + 12 [θD (p)− k+]
}
dθ +
1∫
K
D(p)
k−dθ
− ck−
piu+i = P
 k
+
D(p)∫
k−
D(p)
[θD (p)− k−] dθ +
K
D(p)∫
k+
D(p)
{
1
2k
+ + 12 [θD (p)− k−]
}
dθ +
1∫
K
D(p)
k+dθ
− ck+
The break-even constraint that determines retail prices is
p

K
D(p)∫
0
θD (p) dθ +
1∫
K
D(p)
Kdθ
 = P

K
D(p)∫
k−
D(p)
θD (p) dθ +
1∫
K
D(p)
Kdθ
 .
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Figure 16: 1P
[
Πds −Πdl]
This may alternatively be written
[P − p]K
[
D (p)− 1
2
K
]
=
1
2
P
[
k−
]2
,
from which it follows that
dp
dk−
=
[P − p] [D (p)−K]− Pk−
K
[
D (p)− 12K
]− [P − p]KD′ (p)
dp
dk+
=
[P − p] [D (p)−K]
K
[
D (p)− 12K
]− [P − p]KD′ (p)
In the relevant range, p < P and D (p) > K, and so dp
dk+
> 0. Also, dp
dk− > 0 if k
− is sufficiently
small.
Setting D (p) = 1− γp, the above profit expressions may be re-written as:
piu−i = [P − c] k− −
P
1− γp
5
4
[
k−
]2
piu+i = [P − c] k+ −
P
1− γp
{
1
2
[
k+
]2 + k−k+ − 1
4
[
k−
]2}
The first-order derivatives of the profit functions are,
∂piu−i
∂ki
= P − c− 5k
−
4
P
1− γp
[
2 +
γk−
1− pγ
∂p
∂k−
]
∂piu+i
∂ki
= P − c− P
1− γp
{
K +
γ
1− γp
[
1
2
[
k+
]2 + k−k+ − 1
4
[
k−
]2] ∂p
∂k+
}
With D (p) = 1− γp, the break-even constraint for the retail price may be written as:
γp2 +
[
K
2
− 1− Pγ
]
p+ P
[
1− [k
−]2
2K
− K
2
]
= 0
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which has the solutions
p− =
1
2γ
[
−X −
√
X2 − 4γY
]
p+ =
1
2γ
[
−X +
√
X2 − 4γY
]
where
X =
K
2
− 1− Pγ < 0 and Y = P
[
1− [k
−]2
2K
− K
2
]
> 0
We can show that p+ is inadmissible. Note first that X2 − 4γY = [1− K2 − γP ]2 +
2γP [
k−]2
K >
[
1− K2 − γP
]2. Furthermore, if 1− γP − K2 < 0, 12γ [−X +√[1− K2 − γP ]2] =
P , while if 1 − γP − K2 > 0, 12γ
[
−X +
√[
1− K2 − γP
]2] = 1γ [1− K2 ] > P . Thus, it follows
that p+ > 12γ
[
−X +
√[
1− γP − K2
]2] ≥ P (with strict inequality if 12K < 1 − γP ), which
cannot be the case (at least at equilibrium). Consequently, the only admissible solution is p−.
Since dX
dk− =
dX
dk+
= 12 , the relationships between price and capacities become
dp
dk−
= − 1
4γ
[
1 +
X − 4γ dY
dk−√
X2 − 4γY
]
dp
dk+
= − 1
4γ
[
1 +
X − 4γ dY
dk+√
X2 − 4γY
]
where
dY
dk−
= −P
2
{
1−
[
k−
K
]2
+ 2
k−
K
}
< 0
dY
dk+
= −P
2
{
1−
[
k−
K
]2}
< 0
Discriminatory Auction
In the discriminatory auction, the corresponding profit expressions are
pid−i = P

k+
D(p)∫
k−
D(p)
k−
θD(p) [θD (p)− k−] dθ +
K
D(p)∫
k+
D(p)
k−
k+
[θD (p)− k−] dθ +
1∫
K
D(p)
k−dθ
− ck−
pid+i = P

K
D(p)∫
k−
D(p)
[θD (p)− k−] dθ +
1∫
K
D(p)
k+dθ
− ck+
The above equations may be written
pid−i = [P − c] k− − P1−pγ
{
[k−]3
2k+
+ [k−]2 + [k−]2 ln k
+
k−
}
pid+i = [P − c] k+ − P1−pγ
[2k−+k+]k+
2
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Taking derivatives:
∂pid−i
∂ki
= P − c− P1−pγ
{
3[k−]2
2k+
+ k− + 2k− ln k
+
k− +
γ
1−pγ
∂p
∂k− [k
−]2
[
1 + k
−
2k+
+ ln k
+
k−
]}
∂pid+i
∂ki
= P − c− P1−pγ
[
K + γ1−pγ
∂p
∂k+
2k−+k+
2 k
+
]
The break-even constraint may be written
p

K
D(p)∫
0
θD (p) dθ +
1∫
K
D(p)
Kdθ
 = P
k+
D(p)∫
k−
D(p)
[
θD (p)− k−] [1 + k−
θD(p)
]
dθ
+P

K
D(p)∫
k+
D(p)
[
θD (p)− k−] [1 + k−
k+
]
dθ +
1∫
K
D(p)
Kdθ

Under the linear demand specification, it becomes:
− 2γp2 + [2Pγ + 2−K] p+ P
{
K +
[k−]2
k+
− 2 + 2 [k
−]2
K
ln
k+
k−
}
= 0 (30)
which has the solutions
p− =
1
4γ
[
X −
√
X2 + 8γY
]
p+ =
1
4γ
[
X +
√
X2 + 8γY
]
where
X = 2Pγ + 2−K > 0 and Y = P
{
K +
[k−]2
k+
− 2 + 2[k
−]2
K
ln
k+
k−
}
.
Again, as with the uniform-price auction, we can show that p+ > 12γ
[
−X +
√
[2γP − 2 +K]2
]
≥
P , and so the only admissible solution is p−. Note that Y < 0 (it is increasing in k− and it
attains a negative value at k− = k+) which guarantees that p− > 0.
We find
dp
dk−
= − 1
4γ
[
1− X − 4γ
dY
dk−√
X2 + 8Y γ
]
=
1√
X2 + 8γY
[
p− dY
dk−
]
< 0
dp
dk+
= − 1
4γ
[
1− X − 4γ
dY
dk+√
X2 + 8Y γ
]
=
1
2
√
X2 + 8γY
[
p− dY
dk+
]
where
dY
dk−
= P
{
1 + 2
[k−]2
Kk+
+ 2k−
k− + 2k+
K2
ln
k+
k−
}
> P
dY
dk+
= P
{
1−
[
k−
k+
]2
+ 2
k+
K
[
k−
k+
]2
− 2
[
k−
K
]2
ln
k+
k−
}
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The sign of −p+ ∂Y
∂k+
depends on the values of k− and k+; a sufficient condition for dY
dk+
> P
is k+ < ek−, in which case dp
dk+
< 0 also.
E Distribution of Demand
The analysis of existence of equilibrium and comparison across auction formats with a general
demand distribution function rely on the properties of firms’ profit functions. Therefore, we
first discuss these properties. We next analyse conditions that must be satisfied for the existence
of equilibrium, before we end the section by comparing outcomes across auction formats.
Expected Profits: Uniform-Price Auction
Suppose demand is distributed according to the function G on [0, 1] and that the density
function G′ is positive everywhere on (0, 1). Assuming that, when multiple equilibria exist at
the price-competition stage, each is played with equal probability, expected profits for firm i,
i = 1, 2, i 6= j, are given as
piui (ki, kj) =
{
piu−i if ki ≤ kj
piu+i if ki ≥ kj
where
piu−i = P
[
k+∫
k−
k−dG (θ) +
K∫
k+
{
1
2k
− + 12 [θ − k+]
}
dG (θ) +
1∫
K
k−dG (θ)
]
− ck−
piu+i = P
[
k+∫
k−
[θ − k−] dG (θ) +
K∫
k+
{
1
2k
+ + 12 [θ − k−]
}
dG (θ) +
1∫
K
k+dG (θ)
]
− ck+
The first-order derivatives are
∂piu−i
∂ki
= P
[
1−G (ki)− 12 [G (ki + kj)−G (kj)]−G
′ (ki) ki
]
− c (31)
∂piu+i
∂ki
= P
[
1−G (ki + kj) + 12
[
G (ki + kj)−G (ki)−G′ (ki) kj
]]− c (32)
while the second-order derivatives are
∂2piu−i
∂k2i
= −P
[
2G′ (ki) +
1
2
G′ (ki + kj) +G′′ (ki) ki
]
(33)
∂2piu+i
∂k2i
= −P
2
[
G′ (ki + kj) +G′(ki) +G′′ (ki) kj
]
(34)
∂2piu−i
∂ki∂kj
= −P
2
[
G′ (ki + kj)−G′ (kj)
]
∂2piu+i
∂ki∂kj
= −P
2
[
G′ (ki + kj) +G′ (ki)
]
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A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for the second-order derivatives to be negative is
that G is convex. If G is concave, the direct second-order derivatives will be negative if the
density function G′ is concave also (because then G′(ki)+G′′ (ki) kj > G′ (ki + kj)). The cross
derivative for the small firm’s profit function is positive (negative) if G is concave (convex); it
is always negative for the large firm.
Expected Profits: Discriminatory Auction
With the discriminatory format, the corresponding profits are
pidi (ki, kj) =
{
pid−i if ki ≤ kj
pid+i if ki ≥ kj
where
pid− = P
 k
+∫
k−
k−
θ
[
θ − k−] dG (θ) + K∫
k+
k−
k+
[
θ − k−] dG (θ) + 1∫
K
k−dG (θ)
− ck−
pid+ = P
 k
+∫
k−
[
θ − k−] dG (θ) + K∫
k+
[
θ − k−] dG (θ) + 1∫
K
k+dG (θ)
− ck+
The first-order derivatives are
∂pid−i
∂ki
= P
 ki+kj∫
ki
[
θ − 2ki
min {θ, kj}
]
G′ (θ) dθ + 1−G (ki + kj)
− c (35)
∂pid+i
∂ki
= P [1−G (ki + kj)]− c (36)
while the second-order derivatives are
∂2pid−i
∂k2i
= −P
[
2
∫ kj
ki
dG(θ)
θ
+ 2
∫ ki+kj
kj
dG(θ)
kj
+G′ (ki + kj)
ki
kj
−G′ (ki)
]
(37)
∂2pid+i
∂k2i
= −PG′ (ki + kj)
∂2pid−i
∂ki∂kj
= −P
kj
[∫ ki+kj
kj
θ − 2ki
kj
G′ (θ) dθ +G′ (ki + kj) ki
]
∂2pid+i
∂ki∂kj
= −PG′ (ki + kj)
For the large firm’s profit function, both the direct and cross second-order derivatives are
always negative. For the small firm’s profit function, the direct second-order derivative is
negative when G is convex. If G is concave and the density function G′ is convex, the result
49
also holds. To see this note that a sufficient condition for the direct second-order derivative to
be negative is
2
∫ k−+k+
k−
dG(θ)
k+
+G′
(
k− + k+
) k−
k+
−G′ (k−) > 0.
In what follows we show that this inequality holds for a convex pdf. To do so we use an
auxiliary result whose statement and proof follows. If G′ is convex then
2
∫ k−+k+
k−
dG(θ)
k+
−G′ (k−) ≥ G′ (k−)+ [k+ − k−]G′′ (k−) . (38)
Let g be a convex function. Since a convex function is locally Lipschitzian, integration by parts
implies ∫ b
x
[b− t] g′(t)dt−
∫ x
a
[t− a] g′(t)dt =
∫ b
a
g(t)dt− [b− a] g(x)
Since g′(t) ≥ g′+(x) for all t ∈ [x, b], if we multiply by [b− t] ≥ 0, t ∈ [x, b] and we integrate on
[x, b] we get, ∫ b
x
[b− t] g′(t)dt ≥ 1
2
[b− x]2 g′+(x). (39)
Similarly, since g′(t) ≤ g′−(x) for all t ∈ [a, x], multiplying both sides by [t− a] ≥ 0, t ∈ [a, x]
and integrating on [a, x] we get,∫ x
a
[t− a] g′(t)dt ≤ 1
2
[x− a]2 g′−(x). (40)
Extracting (40) from (39), we deduce∫ b
a
g(t)dt− [b− a] g(x) ≥ 1
2
[
[b− x]2 g′+(x)− [x− a]2 g′−(x)
]
If x is a point of differentiability for g, then g′+(x) = g′−(x) = g′(x) and the inequality above
simplifies to
1
b− a
∫ b
a
g(t)dt− g(x) ≥
[
a+ b
2
− x
]
g′(x)
Taking a = k−, b = k− + k+, x = k−, and g = G′, we have∫ k−+k+
k−
dG(θ)
k+
−G′ (k−) ≥ [k+ − k−
2
]
G′′
(
k−
)
and∫ k−+k+
k−
dG(θ)
k+
≥ G′ (k−)+ [k+ − k−
2
]
G′′
(
k−
)
Adding up the two inequalities above, the result (38) is derived. Using the derived inequality,
the second-order derivative is negative if
G′
(
k−
)
+
[
k+ − k−]G′′ (k−)+G′ (k− + k+) k−
k+
> 0,
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which holds trivially as G′ (k−) + [k+ − k−]G′′ (k−) is the linear approximation (the tangent
line y(x) = G′ (k−) + (x− k−)G′′(k−)) to G′′ at argument k− passing by x = k+, and it hence
satisfies
G′
(
k−
)
+
[
k+ − k−]G′′ (k−) > G′ (k− + k+) > 0
as G′ is convex.
Last, the second-order cross derivative of the small firm’s profit function is always negative.
This is easy to see for the case kj ≥ 2ki, as then
∫ ki+kj
kj
[θ−2ki]
kj
G′ (θ) dθ > 0. We therefore
concentrate on the case ki ≤ kj < 2ki.
If G is convex, we find, using integration by parts,∫ ki+kj
kj
θ − 2ki
kj
G′ (θ) dθ +G′ (ki + kj) ki
=
kj − ki
kj
G (ki + kj) +
2ki − kj
kj
G (kj)−
∫ ki+kj
kj
G (θ)
kj
dθ +G′ (ki + kj) ki
≥ kj − ki
kj
G (ki + kj) +
2ki − kj
kj
G (kj)− ki
kj
G (ki + kj) +G′ (ki + kj) ki
=
kj − ki
kj
[G (ki + kj)−G (kj)] + ki
kj
[
G (ki) +G′ (ki + kj) kj −G (ki + kj)
]
≥ kj − ki
kj
[G (ki + kj)−G (kj)] ≥ 0
The first and last inequalities follow from the fact that G is a non-decreasing function, while
the second inequality follows from the assumption that G is convex. Therefore ∂
2pid−i
∂ki∂kj
≤ 0,
where the inequality is strict if ki > 0.
When G is concave, we have∫ ki+kj
kj
θ − 2ki
kj
G′ (θ) dθ +G′ (ki + kj) ki ≥
∫ ki+kj
kj
θ − 2ki
kj
G′ (ki + kj) dθ +G′ (ki + kj) ki
=
ki
2kj
[4kj − 3ki]G′ (ki + kj) > 0,
from which the result follows.
Note that, if G is convex over some intervals and concave over others, we may combine the
above arguments to prove that ∂
2pid−i
∂ki∂kj
≤ 0 for any G.
Equilibrium Existence: Uniform-Price Auction
In this and the next subsection we show that, provided second-order conditions are satisfied,
(i) there exist exactly two pure-strategy equilibria in capacity choices, one with k1 < k2 and
the other with k1 > k2, and (ii) aggregate equilibrium capacity in the discriminatory auction
is given by G−1
(
1− cP
)
whereas aggregate capacity in the uniform-price auction is bounded
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below (above) byG−1
(
1− cP
)
if G is convex (concave). We start with the uniform-price auction
in this section and consider the discriminatory auction in the next.
If the second-order derivatives are negative, the profit function is piecewise concave and
continuous everywhere, in particular at ki = kj . Choose an arbitrary but fixed value for kj .
Then, the payoff functions piu−i (·, kj), piu+i (·, kj) are single-peaked on the interval [0, 1], with
unconstrained maxima at k−i (kj), and k
+
i (kj). Since, along the diagonal,
lim
ki↓k
∂piu+i (ki, k)
∂ki
− lim
ki↑k
∂piu−i (ki, k)
∂ki
= G′ (k)
k
2
> 0, (41)
k+i (kj) is interior if and only if limki↓k
∂piu+i (ki,k)
∂ki
≥ 0, whereas k−i (kj) is interior if and only if
limki↑k
∂piu−i (ki,k)
∂ki
≤ 0. Thus we only need to distinguish between three cases: (a) If limki↓k ∂pi
u+
i (ki,k)
∂ki
≥
limki↑k
∂piu−i (ki,k)
∂ki
≥ 0, the global maximum is k+i (kj); (b) If limki↑k ∂pi
u−
i (ki,k)
∂ki
≤ limki↓k ∂pi
u+
i (ki,k)
∂ki
<
0, the global maximum is k−i (kj); (c) If limki↓k
∂piu+i (ki,k)
∂ki
≥ 0 and limki↑k ∂pi
u−
i (ki,k)
∂ki
≤ 0, both
k−i (kj) and k
+
i (kj) are interior. To determine the global maximum, we compare profits at the
two local maxima. To do so, let us first implicitly define k∗ and k∗∗ as,
lim
ki↑k∗
∂piu−i (ki, k
∗)
∂ki
= 0, and
lim
ki↓k∗∗
∂piu+i (ki, k
∗∗)
∂ki
= 0.
Given that (41) implies limki↓k∗
∂piu+i (ki,k
∗)
∂ki
> 0, it follows from the concavity of piu+i that
k∗∗ > k∗. Using the above definitions, note that (41) also implies
piu−i
(
k−i
(
k∗j
)
, k∗j
)− piu+i (k+i (k∗j ) , k∗j ) < 0 (42)
piu−i
(
k−i
(
k∗∗j
)
, k∗∗j
)− piu+i (k+i (k∗∗j ) , k∗∗j ) > 0.
Furthermore, the difference in profits is a strictly increasing function in kj ∈ [k∗, k∗∗] ,
dpiu−i
(
k−i (kj) , kj
)
dkj
− dpi
u+
i
(
k+i (kj) , kj
)
dkj
> 0. (43)
It is straightforward to check this result if G is concave, given the signs of the first-order
cross derivatives. If G is convex, both derivatives are negative, so we compute the difference
explicitly. It is given by
P
2
[
G′ (kj) k−i +G
(
k+i + kj
)−G (k−i + kj)+G (k+i )−G (kj)] > 0,
where the inequality follows from the fact that both k+i and k
−
i are interior within this region
so that k−i < kj < k
+
i implies G
(
k+i + kj
)
> G
(
k−i + kj
)
and G
(
k+i
)
> G (kj) . Consequently,
(42) and (43) ensure that there exists a unique kˆj ∈ [k∗, k∗∗] such that
piu−i
(
k−i
(
kˆj
)
, kˆj
)
− piu+i
(
k+i
(
kˆj
)
, kˆj
)
= 0.
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At kj = kˆj both k−i and k
+
i are a best reply. For values kj < kˆj the best reply is k
+
i , whereas
for kj > kˆj the best reply is k−i . Note that k
∗ < kˆj < k∗∗.
In summary, the best-response functions in the uniform-price auction for firm i, i = 1, 2,
i 6= j, are discontinuous at (at most) one point and are given by:
kui (kj) =
{
k−i (kj) if kj ≥ kˆj
k+i (kj) if kj ≤ kˆj ,
where k−i (kj) is strictly decreasing (increasing) for any convex (concave) demand function and
k+i (kj) is always strictly decreasing. Finally note that firms’ best-reply functions are equal as
their payoff functions are identical.
If G is convex, then the best response by either firm is a decreasing function, so that any
crossing of the two best replies must take place outside the discontinuity region. Furthermore,
since k∗1 = k∗2 = k∗ < k∗∗1 = k∗∗2 = k∗∗ they cross twice as k
+
1 (0) = G
−1 (P−c
P
)
< 1 and k−2 > 0
at k1 = 1, which ensures that two asymmetric equilibria exist.
If G is concave, existence of a candidate equilibrium of the form
(
k+1 , k
−
2
)
(a solution to
the system of FOCs) is trivially guaranteed as k−2 (k1) is a strictly increasing function whereas
k+1 (k2) is strictly decreasing and hence bounded above by k
+
1 (0) = G
−1 (P−c
P
)
. Hence, all we
need to show is that the solution to the system of FOCs satisfies k− (k+) ≤ kˆ. Assume, for
contradiction, that k−(k+) > kˆ. If best replies cross in the discontinuity region, then
piu+i
(
k+
(
kˆ
)
, kˆ
)
= piu−i
(
k−
(
kˆ
)
, kˆ
)
< piu−i
(
k−
(
kˆ
)
, k+
(
kˆ
))
< piu−i
(
kˆ, k+
(
kˆ
))
. (44)
The first equality follows for the definition of kˆ. The second inequality follows from the fact
that the first cross derivative of the small firm is positive, which shows that the small firm’s
profit is increasing in the capacity choice of its rival. Lastly, since best replies cross in the
discontinuity region, pi−i
(
·, k+
(
kˆ
))
must attain its maximum at some ki ≥ kˆ. This implies
that the small firm’s profit function is increasing in its own capacity for any capacity below kˆ,
which explains the third inequality.
Let us use the following notation. For an arbitrary pair (k−, k+), the difference in the profits
made by the large and the small firm is given by ∆piui (k
−, k+) = piu+i (k
+, k−)− piu−i (k−, k+):
∆piui
(
k−, k+
)
= k+
P 1∫
k+
G′ (θ) dθ − c
− k−
P 1∫
k−
G′ (θ) dθ − c
+ P k+∫
k−
[
θ − k−]G′ (θ) dθ.
Taking the derivative of the above expression with respect to k−, and dividing it by P, we get
1
P
∂∆piui (k
−, k+)
∂k−
= −
[
1− c
P
]
+G′
(
k−
)
+ k−G′
(
k−
)− [G(k+)−G (k−)]
Take any pair (k−, k+) at which the small firm’s FOC is increasing in its own capacity. Rear-
ranging (31), we get
−
[
1− c
P
]
+G
(
k−
)
+G′
(
k−
)
k− < −1
2
[
G
(
k− + k+
)−G (k+)]
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Hence, at such a point (k−, k+),
∂∆piui (k
−, k+)
∂k−
< −P
2
[
G
(
k− + k+
)−G (k+)]− P [G(k+)−G (k−)] < 0.
The above result and the fact that the profit function is everywhere continuous, in particular at
symmetric capacity pairs, i.e., ∆piui (k
+, k+) = 0, imply piu+i (k
+, k−) > piu−i (k
−, k+) for pairs
(k−, k+) at which the small firm’s FOC is increasing in its own capacity.
At the capacity pair
(
kˆ, k+
(
kˆ
))
the small firm’s FOC is increasing in its own capacity
since, by the fact that best replies cross in the discontinuity region, k−
(
k+
(
kˆ
))
> kˆ. Hence,
applying the result immediately above, we get piu+i
(
k+
(
kˆ
)
, kˆ
)
> piu−i
(
kˆ, k+
(
kˆ
))
, which
contradicts (44). The contradiction shows our claim, i.e., k−(k+) ≤ kˆ which is sufficient
to ensure that any crossing point between the best reply functions takes place outside the
discontinuity region and to ultimately guarantee equilibrium existence.
Finally, since an equilibrium pair
(
k+1 , k
−
2
)
satisfies (32), aggregate capacity is bounded
below (above) by G−1
(
P−c
P
)
if G is convex (concave) as it implies G
(
k+1 + k
−
2
) − G (k+1 ) −
G′
(
k+1
)
k−2 > (<) 0.
Equilibrium Existence: Discriminatory Auction
The proof follows the same steps as the one for the uniform-price auction. Nevertheless, we
need to add the following pieces of information, which are specific to the discriminatory auction.
Along the diagonal,
lim
ki↓k
∂pid+i (ki, k)
∂ki
− lim
ki↑k
∂pid−i (ki, k)
∂ki
= P
∫ 2k
k
2k − θ
k
G′ (θ) dθ > 0
For k∗ and k∗∗ implicitly defined similarly as before, we have
pid−i
(
k−i (k
∗) , k∗
)− pid+i (k+i (k∗) , k∗) < 0
pid−i
(
k−i (k
∗∗) , k∗∗
)− pid+i (k+i (k∗∗) , k∗∗) > 0.
Furthermore, the difference in profits is a strictly increasing function of kj for any kj ∈ [k∗, k∗∗]:
dpid−i
(
k−i (kj) , kj
)
dkj
− dpi
d+
i
(
k+i (kj) , kj
)
dkj
= −
∫ k−i +kj
kj
k−i
k2j
[
θ − k−i
]
G′ (θ) dθ +G
(
k+i + kj
)−G (kj)
=
∫ k−i +kj
kj
{
1− k
−
i
k2j
[
θ − k−i
]}
G′ (θ) dθ +G
(
k+i + kj
)−G (k−i + kj)
=
∫ k−i +kj
kj
1
k2j
[
k2j + k
−2
i − k−i θ
]
G′ (θ) dθ +G
(
k+i + kj
)−G (k−i + kj) > 0
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since k+i > k
−
i and k
2
j +
(
k−i
)2 − k−i θ > k2j + [k−i ]2 − k− [k−i + kj] > 0. Therefore, there exists
a unique kj = kˆ ∈ (k∗, k∗∗) such that pi−i
(
k−i
(
kˆ
)
, kˆ
)
− pi+i
(
k+i
(
kˆ
)
, kˆ
)
= 0.
At kj = kˆ, both k−i and k
+
i are a best reply. For values kj < kˆ, the best reply is k
+
i , whereas
for kj > kˆ the best reply is k−i .In summary, the best-response functions in the discriminatory
auction for firm i = 1, 2, i 6= j, are as follows:
kdi (kj) =
{
k−i (kj) if kj ≥ kˆ
k+i (kj) if kj ≤ kˆ
Notice that kdi (kj) is discontinuous at kj = kˆ. If G is convex, both k
−
i (kj) and k
+
i (kj) are
decreasing functions. If G is concave and G′ is convex, k+i (kj) and k
−
i (kj) are also decreasing
functions.
In the discriminatory auction, since k−i (kˆ) < k
+
i (kˆ) and the best replies are decreasing
functions with k+i (0) = G
−1 (P−c
P
)
< 1 and k−i (1) > 0, they must cross outside the discontinuity
region, which guarantees that there is a Nash equilibrium of the form
(
k−1 , k
+
2
)
. Finally, since
the best replies are identical for both players
(
k+2 , k
−
1
)
is also an equilibrium.
Finally, an equilibrium satisfies P
[
1−G
(
k−i + k
+
j
)]
− c = 0. Consequently aggregate
capacity, K = k−i + k
+
j , equals G
−1(P−cP ).
Proof of Proposition 12
Since KFB = G−1
(
1− cv
)
and Kd = G−1
(
1− cP
)
, we have Kd ≤ KFB, independently of the
shape of G. Furthermore, from the characterisation of equilibrium, we know that Ku ≤ Kd if
G is concave and Ku ≥ Kd if G is convex.
Suppose G is concave. Since Ku ≤ Kd and Kd ≤ KFB, it follows directly that Ku ≤ Kd ≤
KFB, where the first inequality is strict if G is strictly concave.
Finally, suppose G is convex. Since both Ku and Kd are monotonically decreasing in P ,
and since KFB = Kd ≤ Ku at P = v while KFB > Kd = Ku = 0 at P = c, there must exist
some value P̂ ∈ (c, v) such that Kd ≤ Ku ≤ KFB if P ≤ P̂ and Kd ≤ KFB < Ku otherwise.
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